LX.
g
51

LX
G
51

CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA

1861–62.

LX
62

GOD
973.09755
Magl Cam
106781

B. B. R. A. S.

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.
CLASS

00106781

Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 20 February, 2020

GEORGE PHILIP & SON, LONDON & LIVERPOOL.

THE CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA

1861-62

BY

T. MILLER MAGUIRE MA, LLD

OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW

106781

REPRINTED FROM THE
"ILLUSTRATED NAVAL AND MILITARY MAGAZINE"

G7E
973.07755
Mag1 Cam
106781
ZX-J-57

LONDON
W. H. ALLEN & CO., LTD., 13, WATERLOO PLACE
Publishers to the India Office

1891

LONDON :

PRINTED BY WOODFALL AND KINDER,

70 TO 76, LONG ACRE, W.C.

PREFACE.

—o—

I HAD proposed to write a short description of the great American Civil War, which is now generally admitted to have been one of the most instructive, as well as interesting, events of modern times.

From a military point of view, its lessons are so valuable, especially to us, who prefer to be Volunteers rather than a nation of regular soldiers, that a study of its strategy is included in the education of our officers.

The stress of business has compelled me to postpone the publication of a history of the war in all its phases. But, as the Campaigns in Virginia, 1861 and 1862, are much discussed at present, I think it may be useful to republish the sketches of their leading features, which have already appeared in the *Illustrated Naval and Military Magazine.*

T. M. MAGUIRE.

12, EARL'S COURT SQUARE, S.W.

THE CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA, 1861-62.

I.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1861.

THE American War of Independence and the consequent loss to England of a mighty Empire have been rightly regarded as among the most important events in the history of the world. But before it had celebrated a century of freedom and greatness the young Republic of the United States had to submit to the severest of ordeals in a far more desperate civil strife than that which unfortunately separated it from the mother country. For four years North America was the scene of an awful struggle, which can only be paralleled in modern war by the religious convulsions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the mighty efforts which at last delivered Europe from the despotism and the genius of Napoleon.

The minds of many military writers seem to be so overwhelmed by the triumphs of German organization and discipline as to have no room for recognizing any other forms of martial and national excellence. By such critics the lessons of the war of 1861–1865 are deemed of trifling significance, because it was not conducted by hordes of regular troops, hardened masters of their art, after long lessons of drill and manœuvring, led by myriads of highly trained officers, and supported by reserves of "nations in arms." Of course these critics are right in the main. Abstract reason and practical experience alike support the old maxim to prepare for war most carefully in peace time, even in the interests of peace. But they may carry their theory too far. They may be induced, by the lessons of 1870–71, to disparage unduly armies of volunteers. Just one hundred years ago the French Revolution turned a rabble of peasants and artisans into the conquerors of Europe.

The admirably-drilled legions of the old German Empire, and of the Tzar, and soldiers brought up under Frederick the Great, soon became accustomed to retire before raw levies directed by young adventurers, whose only teachers were strong native talents and stronger necessity.

So the citizens of the Western Republic rushed to war from their farms and their shops, and, without any preparation, at once displayed undaunted heroism in the midst of unprecedented carnage. Their dogged resolution in the face of every variety of difficulty and danger, suffering death, both from the ruggedness of nature and the ingenuity of man, would have done credit to the veterans of Wellington. It will be well for England if her sons in a crisis do as much to preserve the unity of their Empire against external insolence or internal faction.

As there had been a small regular army before the beginning of the war some of the American troops on both sides were taught their business as they were marching to the front, by leaders of technical proficiency; but the vast majority of officers were civilians in uniform, whose skill was developed by patient observation under the strain of actual campaigning. Of course, as the contest was long continued, ability, energy, and daring found their way upwards, and, before it was over, the strategists of Europe began to find in its records illustrations of the highest conceptions of their art; tacticians observed with imitative interest new forms of improvised defence, and the best schools of this and the next generation will justly be proud if they can produce generals in "fame's eternal bede-roll worthy to be filed" with Sherman, Sheridan, and Grant, or with Jackson, Stewart, and Lee.

In truth it was a very great and ennobling war, and Mr. Bright was right in regarding it as well-nigh sublime. The people of the United States look back to it with legitimate satisfaction, and, now that the passions generated in its progress are appeased, the peoples of these isles admire the nobility of character displayed by their kinsmen.

What is a great war? In what element of greatness is the history of this war lacking? Each side firmly believed that it was "thrice armed" by having its quarrel just. Those who called themselves Confederates unquestionably interpreted the Constitution of their country as meaning that each State had a right to secede from the others when its individual interests dictated such a step; the question of the extension or even retention of slavery was not by any means the only issue. They held that their poli-

tical independence was about to be trampled upon by a political faction in the north; of this the election of Abraham Lincoln, a very decided opponent of their views, as President, appeared conclusive evidence. They therefore banded themselves together in a great confederation, from the Potomac to the Mexican Gulf and from Florida to Texas, in support not only of their material prosperity, which, they thought, depended upon slavery, but also of their rights as citizens. On the other hand, the people of the northern States and the new territories of the West were not mere abolitionist fanatics, and philanthropic worshippers of Mrs. Stowe's Uncle Tom; they saw that their mighty nation could never survive claims by several or any one of its constituent parts to leave it at pleasure for any cause, wrong or right, and they were resolved to maintain the Imperial power of the central government. Was northern Anglo-Saxon America to follow the miserable example of southern Spanish America, and break up into an anarchy of petty and hostile republics, or were the United States to be one and indivisible, and to go on expanding into a consolidated community of unrivalled magnificence? The dispute about negro slavery could be postponed, but there must be no tampering with the Union; the future of the English-speaking race and of mankind was at stake. This was a cause worthy of the utmost effort; success would repay every sacrifice. The Federals risked their all for this, and won; already the children of their opponents rejoice in their victory.

Burke says that war never leaves a people where it found them; the result is either elevation or degeneracy. These combatants were distinctly elevated. It was much that an untrammelled democracy should willingly submit to the strict bonds of military discipline; it was still better that the Yankee should prove himself not altogether a child of Mammon, but quite as ready to part with wealth and life for his principles as were his Puritan ancestors.

The loss of life was enormous; it is variously calculated. Mulhall says 656,000; if so, the mortality was as great as any recorded in authentic history. The most moderate calculations make the number of victims half a million. In ten engagements no fewer than 10,000 perished on each side! Grant's campaign of 1864–1865 cost 180,000 lives; this seems incredible to one who has not followed with some care the severe and unremitting exertions of both armies in this period. Sherman's celebrated march through Georgia to the sea cost 125,000 lives. Of course, the

loss of life does not represent all the suffering; wounds and wasting diseases left permanent marks on myriads of survivors. In November, 1862, no fewer than 100,000 Federal soldiers were on the sick list; the zeal and charity of non-combatants had abundance of scope in providing for the stricken soldiers. The desperate character of the assaults delivered will appear from the fact that, whereas at Sadowa the ratio of men *hors de combat* was 8 per cent., and at Gravelotte 15 per cent., at Gettysburg it was 40 per cent.

The expenditure of money on the war was also enormous. The National Debt was increased in four years by about £550,000,000; in fact, all the resources of the State and of all its citizens were devoted to the maintenance of the vast forces in the field; there was no disposition to grudge expense, there was no stinginess, no cheese-paring. The Exchequer was ever open to the demands of the men, and its contributions were liberally supplemented by individual generosity; as Lord Wolseley says: "The men were splendidly equipped, abundantly fed, provided with all sorts of artillery and engineer material of the most approved patterns, and upon the most lavish scale."

At the commencement of the war the regular army was about 15,000 men all told, of whom many of the best officers and men were afterwards found in the Confederate ranks. Now, in July, 1861, there were 660,000 men in the Federal army, and no less than 1,500,000 in 1865. A similar rapid development is observable in the fleet. In 1860 it consisted of less than 100 vessels of all kinds, but, in October, 1862, there were 256 vessels, many of them very novel and formidable instruments of destruction. Few officers of any navy would be ashamed of Admiral Farragut's record. The whole system of maritime warfare was changed by the performances of the *Monitor* and *Merrimac;* future privateers could not do better than imitate the example of the *Alabama.*

This is not the place for an enumeration of the leading principles of strategy and tactics, but it would not be hard to prove that they are fully illustrated in the American campaigns. Rüstow makes many valuable deductions from its history, and Sir E. Hamley repeatedly refers to its incidents to support the views set forth in his *Operations of War.* Take the principle of interior against exterior lines, or, as Hamley would say, combined against independent movements, the operations of Joseph Johnston and Beauregard in 1861, and of Jackson and Lee in 1862, are excellent evidence of its value. Capital examples of skilful changes of base

and flank movements, in spite of an alert enemy, are found in McClellan's operations from the Chickahominy to the James in 1862, and in Grant's movements from the Rapidan to south of Richmond, 1864–65. How to dislodge an adversary who is too strong to be attacked in front is set forth in Sherman's march from Chattanooga to Atlanta, 1864; and how to traverse an enemy's lines and destroy his communications, by the same officer's brilliant, though ruthless, advance from Atlanta to Savannah, and northwards to Goldsboro', 1864–65. For skilful handling of independent cavalry the raids of Sheridan and Stuart —the American Murat—are brilliant lessons; nor, indeed, are the exploits of Forrest and Kilpatrick of much less interest. Railways played such an important part in America that engineers can follow their influence on campaigns better there than in any other war, and in the destruction of railroads the Federal officers attained a marvellous degree of efficiency. Vicksburg and Richmond are among the seven most remarkable sieges of recent times, Sebastopol, Kars, Metz, Paris, and Plevna being the other five. Does a powerful and numerous community wish to crush out an enemy feebler in numbers but devoted and brave, let it study the process of "attrition" whereby Grant exhausted the Confederates. Does a small but high-spirited State propose to maintain its liberty against overwhelming odds, let it meditate on the theories of Beauregard and the practice of Lee.

The use of the spade in modern war was first recognized in America, and there all the appliances of the most elaborate machinery and the ingenuity of the ablest artisans were utilized for the invention of effective engines of destruction. Stupendous engineering works, rivalling any of ancient or modern times, were undertaken. An attempt on the part of the Federals to divert the course of the Mississippi, near Vicksburg, in 1863, reminds us of the capture of Babylon by the Medes and Persians.

But enough of generalities; it is time to come to details.

The Northern Free and the Southern Slave States had long disagreed as to the authority of the Central and State legislatures as to trade policy, and above all as to the peculiar institution of negro slavery. The Missouri Compromise, 1820, supposed to settle this latter question with regard to future additions to the Union, satisfied no party; the folly of fanatical abolitionists, illustrated by John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry, aggravated the tension of public feeling, and the people of the South saw with dismay the triumphs of their enemies at the election of November, 1860.

The election of President Lincoln was immediately followed by the secession of South Carolina, December 26; in January, 1861, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, imitated its example, then Texas, Tennessee, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Eastern Virginia, as well as New Mexico and Arizona. Western Virginia remained faithful to the Union.

In Missouri parties were evenly divided: Kentucky wanted to remain neutral, but its sympathies were with the Union. After some agitation and mob rioting at Baltimore Maryland passed over to the same side.

Lincoln entered upon the discharge of his duties March 4, 1861, and announced his decided resolve to maintain the integrity of the United States. For some time party leaders on both sides indulged in a war of words and complicated wire-pulling, till the bold policy of Major Anderson at Fort Sumter, in defying the Confederates of Charleston, diverted public attention from lawyers to soldiers. Richmond had been selected as the Confederate capital by a congress of the seceding states assembled at Montgomery in February, and Jefferson Davis, a practical soldier and statesman, became the first President of the new community. He ordered General Beauregard, an old West Point officer of very considerable ability, to bombard Fort Sumter. This was done effectively, and in a few days the brave garrison had to surrender.

Thus the war began.

The theatre of operations was immense beyond precedent, and distinguished by every variety of natural characteristics. The thirteen states of 1783 had become thirty-four, with a population of about 32,000,000, and now extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico.

Of course it was impossible for even the great multitudes that ultimately formed the contending armies to fight all over this enormous field, and at the beginning, when the forces were comparatively small, it was evident that some steps must be taken to localise the contest. It was clear that the principal fighting must take place in the border teritory. To quote General Badeau:—

"The belt of territory reaching from the Atlantic westward, and comprising Maryland and Virginia east of the Alleghanies, and Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri west of these mountains, was the stage on which the first act of the drama was performed. The Potomac and the James at the east; the Ohio, the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Mississippi at the west, are the great streams, the control of which, and of the populations and regions

that lie in their valleys, is indispensable to a mastery of the continent. The Ohio flows westward from Pennsylvania to Missouri —a thousand miles—Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois lie along its northern bank, while Virginia and Kentucky form its southern shore; it was the natural line of demarcation at the west between the Slave States and the Free. The Tennessee and Cumberland, rising in the recesses of the Alleghany Mountains, flow southward into the State of Tennessee, and then run west for hundreds of miles, the larger river making a wide *détour* into Alabama and Mississippi; when, turning to the north again, they traverse Kentucky side by side, and empty into the Ohio, near the point where that still greater stream becomes itself a tributary and pours the water of its hundred affluents into the Mississippi. The Mississippi, recipient and greatest of them all, divides the continent for 4,000 miles, bounds ten different States, and enriches all the regions between the Rocky and the Alleghany Mountains."

The States abounded in every form of mineral and agricultural resources; they had a thriving commerce, and the material prosperity of the people was far beyond what had been hitherto known among the masses of any nation.

The area of the Confederate States alone was greater than France, Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain put together. Most of the inhabitants were well educated; all were quick witted, fertile in expedients, shrewd to a proverb, a mixture of several leading races, physically of a superior type: above all, like Goldsmith's Britons—

> Proud in their native hardihood of soul,
> True to imagined right, beyond control.

Though the northern States were more than twice as populous as the southern—of the total 32,000,000 they had 22,000,000—and very much richer, their industrial and trading habits did not fit them so thoroughly for the trade of arms as the open-air life, sporting tastes, and pride of caste which were the distinguishing traits of the white dwellers south of the Potomac. The regular army of the Union, about 15,000 strong, was scattered in various frontier forts; it broke up after the commencement of the war, and many of its best officers joined the Confederates, and materially promoted their rapid organization. By the end of April they had 35,000 men ready; they proposed to raise 100,000, and a loan of 5,000,000 dollars. They also revived the practice of privateering. Every American was liable to military service in the militia for

national defence, and 75,000 soon answered the call of the northern President; but they were only obliged to serve for three months, and went home just as they were beginning to be useful. Lincoln soon tried to remedy this by calling out 42,000 volunteers for three years' service, and 18,000 sailors, serving from one to three years.

It is not to be supposed that at first the population of the Federal States was unanimous; it is never possible in such issues for all the populace to be of one mind. The wire-pullers and factions were scheming and intriguing before and during the course of the hostilities; many of the Democratic party actually sympathized with the south; the timid shrank from an armed conflict, and the doctrinaires were eloquent in opposition to Coercion. But, on the whole, the north and south were resolute, and their determination became desperate as the war went on.

It can scarcely be regarded as an ordinary civil war, as each belligerent had from the start a complete separate political organization.

Beyond doubt the northern army, like our own forces in the Great Rebellion, fancied that the struggle would be short—"they would whip Jeff Davis in six weeks"; but they were doomed to severe disappointment. The first affair at Sumter (April 11–13) was quickly followed by the destruction of warlike stores at Harper's Ferry and Norfolk, lest they should fall into the hands of the Confederates; the southern ports were blockaded, and the Federals seized upon the Arlington heights on the opposite side of the Potomac to Washington, and began to fortify them. Some fighting occurred in the month of June in Missouri, where General Lyon surprised the enemy at Camp Jackson after a few skirmishes, and secured Jefferson city for the Union. The importance of possessing commanding positions on the Mississippi, which led to dreadful conflicts later on, induced the Confederates to send General Polk to seize Columbus in Kentucky, a hostile act which caused the State to abandon its neutrality and join the Union.

But the most important political event, as well as strategic lesson, of 1861 was the campaign in Virginia. As this State was the scene of the most desperate and most decisive fighting from 1861 to the end of the war, its topography must be studied. It stretches from Maryland and Pennsylvania in the north to South Carolina on the south, and covers an area of 60,000 square miles. It is traversed in its entire length by the Alleganies and the Blue Ridge, which run parallel with each other and with the sea. From the sea the land


MARYLAND
VIRGINIA
WEST VIRGINIA
Chambersburg
Gettysburg
Hagerston
Emmittsburg
Cumberland
Hancock
Williamport
Sharpsburg
Middletown
Frederick
Martinsburg
Charleston
Point of Rocks
Baltimore
Susquehanna R
Potomac R
Cheat R
Romney
Winchester
Kerntown
Balls Bluff
Poolesville
Leesburg
Edwards Ferry
Aldie
Strasburg
Moorfield
S. Branch Potomac R
Front Royal
Shenandoah R
Blue Ridge Mts
Ashby Gap
Thoroughfare Gap
Chester Gap
Orleans
Gainesville
Bristoe
Manassas Jun.
Bull Run
Centreville
Chantilly
Arlington
Fairfax C.H.
Alexandria
WASHINGTON
Annapolis
Bladensburg
Potomac R
Chesapeake Bay
Woodstock
Mt Jackson
New Market
Thorntons Gap
Waterloo
Warrenton
Sperryville
Sulphur Springs
Rappahannock R
Franklin
Harrisonburg
Rocks Gap
Cross Keys
Port Republic
Swift Run Gap
Culpeper
Kelly's Ford
Rapidan R
Brandy Station
Elk Ford
Dumfries
Aquia Creek
Fredericksburg
Chancellorsville
Wilderness
Spotsylvania
Guinea
Potomac River
Mc Dowell's
Staunton
Waynesboro
Orange C.H.
Gordonsville
Charlottesville
North Anna
Mattaponi R
South Anna
Pamunky R
Columbia
Hanover C.H.
Ashland
Urbana
James R
Richmond
West Point
White House
Chickahominy R
Glendale
Malvern
Harrisons Landing
Gloucester C.H.
York River
Lynchburg
Appomattox R
City Point
Williamsburg
York Town
Petersburg
Big Bethel
Burkesville
Hampton Roads
Fort Munroe
Norfolk
Henry
Danville
Weldon
Scale of Miles.
10 0 10 20 30 40 50
GENERAL MAP
to illustrate Campaign of
1862
Railways
T.M.M.
BRETTELL, St. RUPERT ST LONDON W.

rises from a low broad belt on the coast, in a tolerably regular gradation of plains and plateaus, first to the Blue Ridge and then to the main ridge. West of the Appalachian chain the country stretches in a medley of hills to the Ohio River. Between the two is the valley of Virginia—sometimes called the Shenandoah Valley—a rich and beautiful region, about sixty miles wide. Two great rivers, the Potomac and the James, rise in the Alleghanies, at a distance from each other of more than 150 miles, and crossing the valley and the Blue Ridge, widen into fine expanses before joining the Atlantic. The Potomac is the northern boundary of Virginia, and on its northern bank lies Washington, the Federal capital, while the James waters the richest region of Central and Southern Virginia, and upon it stands, at the head of its navigation, Richmond, an important strategic point with regard to the railway system, and hence of the utmost value as a base of supply. To its north ran the Fredericksburg and Virginia Central railroads, connecting it with Washington and the valley of Virginia. South, the Richmond-Petersburg railway went to Weldon in North Carolina, and thence along the Atlantic coast as far as Florida, also, by another branch, to Lynchburg, whence there were lines to Chattanooga and into the valley. There was another line from Richmond to Danville. There was also a line from Petersburg to Norfolk, parallel with the James. Therefore ample resources, both of food and other materials, were at the disposal of the Confederate capital. The James runs south-east, from the Blue Ridge to the Atlantic; but the Potomac earlier in its course makes a southerly deflection, and then in a winding course goes on to Chesapeake Bay, fifty miles north of the James. The space between these rivers is watered by the Rappahannock, the Mattapony, the Pamunkey, with its affluents, the North and South Anna, and the Chickahominy; this last is a tributary of the James, but the others flow into Chesapeake Bay. Of course, all these streams are joined by numerous creeks, and the country is in many places very difficult for manœuvring; for example, the wilderness or wooded country near Chancellorsville, through which Grant had to force his way in 1864, and the swampy forests between the Chickahominy and the James, through which McClellan retreated in 1862.

The West Virginians, promptly repudiating those of the East, declared for the old flag, and started practically a new State, with Wheeling as its capital; but it was necessary to clear it of Confederate troops. These had been sent from Staunton, at the southern end of the Shenandoah Valley, across the mountains

to Beverly, under Porterfield. This officer was destroying the Baltimore and Ohio railway, when General McClellan, a West Point officer of about 35 years of age, with a very brilliant record of services, and high in the favour of the Commander-in-Chief, Scott, started from Wheeling, May 26, and his troops, after a fatiguing night march, surprised and defeated the enemy at Philippi. Garnett superseded Porterfield; but his force, after some stiff operations on both sides, in very bad weather, amid pathless forests and rugged mountains, was beaten at Rich Mountain; and, again, after a very skilful pursuit by McClellan, at Carrick's Ford, where he was killed, July 23. This campaign, though very insignificant as to numbers and losses compared with the later efforts, was followed by striking results. It gave McClellan a great reputation. His despatch put his success in such a favourable light as to gain him the epithet of the "*Young* Napoleon," though as old as was the latter at Austerlitz, and made all eyes turn to him as the probable saviour of the North after the disaster of Bull Run. All these operations, however, were incidental; the really decisive events took place in the Shenandoah Valley, and along the little river Bull Run. These gave the Confederates the status of serious belligerents, and were as valuable to the party of Secession as was the English defeat at Saratoga in 1777 to the cause of independence.

The following was the posture of affairs east of the Alleghanies in the beginning of June. The first care of Scott, a fine old veteran, who had defeated the Mexicans fifteen years before, was to protect the capital. In it, and around it, and in the entrenched camp of Alexandria, he had 45,000 men, and he commenced strong works for its defence. He entrusted the command of his troops in this quarter to Major-General Irwin McDowell, a West Point officer of experience. At Fort Monroe, in the York Town Peninsula, was a division under General Butler. This position was to serve as a kind of *tête de pont* in the event of movements on Richmond in this direction. At Hagerstown, on McDowell's right, was another force, which was to operate in the valley under the veteran General Patterson, who had fought against the English in 1812, and was engaged in Mexico, 1845–47. Opposite to Butler was a line of Confederate entrenchments, between the York river and the James, with its left on the fortified place of York Town. General Lee, who got command in Virginia, April 23rd, did not countenance Beauregard's plan for forthwith attacking Washington, and the mass of the forces under the latter officer assembled opposite the works of

Alexandria, with the object of obstructing an attack from the Potomac. On the left, General Joseph Johnston, who had been Quartermaster-General of the old army, with a very feeble force at first, but one which was constantly reinforced, occupied the town of Harper's Ferry (Harper's Ferry to Washington, 50 miles). The superiority of numbers was decidedly on the side of the Federals.

Although the possession of Harper's Ferry was of some significance, it was far from being a decisive strategic point, and Johnston, recognizing this, notwithstanding the wishes of his Government, resolved to abandon it when it was seriously threatened in flank. Patterson, after the collapse of the disturbances in Maryland, determined on attacking this post. He moved by way of Hagerstown and Williamsport; but, although he made great fighting professions, and wrote to the Secretary of War, "If you place forces at my disposal, shoot me if I do not use them to advantage," his progress was so tardy that Johnston, who had barely 6,000 men, was able to spike his guns at Harper's Ferry, destroy the bridge over the Potomac, and retreat with impunity on Winchester, about 25 miles distant. After some hesitation, the Federals followed on June 16. For two weeks the armies remained in observation, and indeed Patterson, whose caution was becoming timidity, retired again behind the Potomac. Now, as a Federal movement from Alexandria on Manassas (distance 26 miles) against Beauregard was in preparation, General Scott ordered Patterson, if not able to beat his adversary, at least to take such measures as would keep him in the Shenandoah Valley, and thus prevent all chance of his joining Beauregard through the passes of the Blue Ridge (Manassas to Blue Ridge 35 miles); the odds were 20,000 men against 9,000, ultimately reinforced to 12,000. The Federal leader crossed the Potomac again at Williamsport, and moved to Martinsburg and fought a skirmish at Falling Waters, which induced the enemy to fall back again to Winchester. Now Patterson began to lose his head altogether; he imagined his force was not sufficient or trustworthy, and although General Sandford was sent from head-quarters to stiffen his resolution, and to warn him against allowing the Confederates to steal a march away from him westward, after a feeble effort towards Winchester, he retired towards Charlestown (July 17). Johnston was as able as Patterson was weak. At midnight of that day he received orders to go to Beauregard. The next day he started, leaving orders to Stuart, the celebrated cavalry officer, to interpose between him and Patterson. At nightfall his advance-guard passed

through Ashby's Gap of the Blue Ridge; by eight next morning it was at Piedmont, and entraining for Manassas. Another detachment arrived there on July 20, and the remainder in time to decide the battle of Bull Run (Winchester to Manassas Junction 50 miles). Patterson's failure to defeat, or at least hold Johnson at Winchester, ruined his military reputation.

It is seldom, indeed, that campaigns are conducted under the influence of strategical considerations alone; even Napoleon had an eye to prestige and political considerations as well as to strategy. France was saved from the grand designs of Marlborough by the spite of English factions. The plans of both Federal and Confederate military chiefs were overruled by popular folly or administrative prejudice. The mass of the people were eager to see immediate fruits for their expenditure, energy, and courage; they were impatient of the delays of organization, and the prudent hesitations of strategists, whose schemes required ripening by time. General Scott was disinclined to undertake any active operations on a large scale with three months' volunteers. He would have been quite content with the enterprises already set forth, and with a skilful defence of the capital. He proposed to turn the new three years' militia into an efficient army; this would occupy the remainder of the summer. He was, as events proved, wise; but what avails wisdom against the clamour of a multitude of voters? The streets resounded with cries of "To Richmond!"—the popular journalists made such brilliant campaigns and "whipped" the enemy so easily in their newspapers, that soon the pride of the nation was highly irritated; enthusiasm conquered common sense, and McDowell's proposal to attack Beauregard in the direction of Manassas with 30,000 men and 10,000 more in reserve was accepted by the Government.

The strategical importance of Manassas Junction was recognized by both parties; the Federal General pointed out that he could beat Beauregard alone, but not if Johnston was allowed to join him; and Beauregard himself, in his very interesting account of the battle of Bull Run, says, "Its value was that, with close proximity to the Federal capital, it held in observation the chief Federal army, then being assembled by General McDowell in the quarter of Arlington, under the immediate eye of the Commander-in-Chief, General Scott, for an offensive movement against Richmond, and, that it had a railway approach in the rear for the easy accumulation of reinforcements and all the necessary munitions of war from the south; at the same time another, the Manassas Gap railway,

diverging laterally from the left to that point, gave rapid access to the fertile valley of the Shenandoah, then teeming with live stock and cereal subsistence, as well as with other resources essential to the Confederates. Thus, during the period of accumulation, seasoning, and training, the Confederate army might be fed from fertile soil that otherwise would fall into the hands of the enemy; but on the other hand, Bull Run, a petty stream, was of little or no defensive strength, for it abounded in fords, and, although for the most part its banks are rocky and abrupt, the side from which it would be approached offensively was in most places the higher, and therefore commanded the opposite ground."

The exact number of men engaged is hard to ascertain, the general opinion being that the Federals were decidedly superior in this respect. On the other hand, Nicolay (Lincoln's private secretary) says that there were actually engaged: Federals 28,568 men and 49 guns, and Confederates 32,000 men and 57 guns; this, of course, including Johnston's reinforcements.

On July 16th McDowell issued his marching orders, and started from Alexandria, moving by Fairfax Court House on Centreville (five miles), July 18th, this position having been abandoned by Beauregard. A skirmish occurred at Blackburn's Ford (Centreville to Blackburn's Ford $2\frac{3}{4}$ miles), which Tyler, the leader of the Federal advance, drifted into.

Already both armies had had unpleasant experiences of the defects of raw levies, and could bear witness to Napier's remark, that in other situations than the battle-field the value of veterans is soon apparent. The Federals say their men could not march, and would not keep order in the ranks. Lads fresh from shops, and delighted with rural objects, used to stop to pick blackberries, and in other ways break the monotony of their journeying; and Beauregard confesses that his splendid youths, the cream of the southern aristocracy, at first came to the front with baggage and servants, commissariat luxuries, and linen shirts, and manifested a decided disinclination for the labours of entrenching.

The affair at Blackburn's Ford induced the Confederate leader to believe that he would be attacked in the centre of his long line, six miles from Stone Bridge to Union Mills, while it determined McDowell to find some unfortified passage whereby he could turn the enemy's *left* instead of right flank. A feint was kept up at Blackburn's Ford, while the engineers sought, during the 19th and 20th, for a passage, which they found at Sudley's Ford. While one division (Tyler's) was to march to Stone Bridge, two others

(Hunter's and Heintzelman's) were to make a secret and circuitous night march of about seven miles to Sudley's Ford, cross there, and, descending on the enemy's side of Bull Run, cover the passage at Stone Bridge, two miles south-east, and by a march on Gainesville, four miles west, interpose between Johnston and Beauregard, of whose union McDowell was then ignorant. A division (Miles') was to remain in reserve at Centreville, and a brigade was to watch Blackburn's Ford.

Beauregard had proposed a vigorous offensive, no less than a converging advance across the fords on Centreville, and an attack on the enemy's camp. But the Federal movement against his left prevented this, and he resolved to advance his right in the direction of Blackburn's Ford, and to stand on the defensive with his left in the neighbourhood of Stone Bridge.

The battle which ensued on Sunday, 21st, was creditable to the persistency and courage of both sides, and showed how much of the hereditary aptitude for war had been transmitted to the English in America during generations of peace. Again and again these untried soldiers advanced to the attack under a withering fire; in the struggle for the possession of Henry Hill, for example, undisciplined volunteers displayed undaunted resolution; the officers sacrificed themselves gallantly, and fresh artillerymen worked their guns with coolness and accuracy. Military prestige and tradition were respected under fire; raw troops were as true to their colours as any old regiment. At a critical part of the day, when the Federals were pressing in Johnston's troops on the left of the Confederate line, some of them gave way, and General Bee cried out, "Look at Jackson's brigade, it stands there like a stone wall!" and thus gave a nickname to a famous commander. When the disorder seemed irretrievable, Beauregard ordered the colours to be planted out to the front, so that the men might rally round them. The standards were advanced forty yards, the men recovered order, and formed on the line of their flags. A national banner is not, even in practical America, a piece of silk and nothing more.

As has been already stated, most of Johnston's force had arrived from the valley, and was actually fighting through the day, and its commander was doing good service, though really the senior officer, as Beauregard's second. When the last instalment of the valley troops arrived from Piedmont by rail at Manassas, six miles in rear of the battle, they were forthwith sent to the front, and arrived on the scene about three o'clock, under General Kirby Smith, who was soon wounded, and replaced by Elzey. The appearance of


Sudley Ford
Poplar Ford
Farm Ford
Stone Bridge
Young's Branch
Lewis' Ford
Henry House
From Gainesville
Ball's Ford
Cub Run
to Chantilly
to Fairfax Court Hº
Centreville
Bull Run
Mitchells Ford
Blackburn's Ford
River
New Market
McLean's Ford
Union Mills
MANASSAS GAP RAILWAY
ORANGE & ALEXANDRIA RAILWAY
Manassas Junctn
BATTLE OF
BULL RUN,
July 21st 1861

this force on the Federal right flank decided the fortunes of the day. The Federals fled over Bull Run in a panic, such as is usual when an inexperienced army is pressed suddenly on a flank. Once driven back, they "went to pieces, like the adjournment of a mass meeting"; but there is no careful student of the history of any country who would sneer at them for this. The men were physically exhausted as well as panic-striken. Can professional European soldiers ridicule them? How did the Prussians fare when Bernadotte turned up at Apolda? How did the French retreat after Woerth?

Beauregard says his pursuit was not so effective as it might have been had he not been persuaded to proceed with two fresh brigades to his right on a false report of a Federal return in that direction.

He also denies a story which is generally circulated, and is countenanced by Sir E. Hamley. It is said that "just as the Southern troops were about to flee the Federals were surprised into doing so by the arrival on their flank of the Shenandoah forces marching from railway trains halted *en route* with that object." This anecdote is clearly a mistake; but in his *Peninsular War* Napier points out how ready the public are to believe in the extraordinary, and to fasten on some striking incident while oblivious of sober fact, in regard to military as well as other transactions. There was nothing very unusual about this battle; as Beauregard says, "Like any other, it was a progression and development from the deliberate counter-employment of the military resources in hand, affected by accidents, as always, but of a very different kind from that referred to. My line of battle, which had twice not only withstood the enemy's attack, but taken the offensive, and driven him back in disorder, was becoming momentarily stronger from the arrival, at last, of the reinforcements provided for; and if the enemy had remained on the field till the arrival of Ewell and Holmes they would have been so strongly out-flanked that many who escaped would have been destroyed or captured."

The successful general also holds that McDowell's flank march to Sudley's Ford was wrong, and would have resulted in utter ruin, but that, owing to some misapprehension, one of the Confederate officers on the right (Ewell) did not press on to Centreville, by McLean's Ford, early in the day, and thus threaten his communications.

Much confusion characterized the retreat; but rather from disorganization and the folly of the Federal commander of the reserve,

who forgot himself during the day, than because of much danger from either the cavalry or infantry of the victors. Night fell upon a decided success for the Separatists, and the dispirited Unionists did not even stand at Centreville. Covered by two brigades that maintained discipline, they hurried back to their camps near Washington. The Federal loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 2,583, the Confederate 1,893. The results of the victory were not as complete as they might have been. It appears that the Government at Richmond did not approve of the concentration of all its forces for a bold stroke on Maryland and against Washington itself. Beauregard, a really skilful strategist, holds that the Confederate army might have been reinforced and made an active and victorious war machine, but, instead of this, Jefferson Davis refused to take men from other places to strengthen the army on the Bull Run. It, therefore, did little, that requires comment, for the remainder of the year. It advanced to the posts which it had occupied before the battle, and the Manassas position was turned into an entrenched camp. On the Federal side the "three months' volunteers" began to return to their homes, and General McDowell was superseded by General McClellan, to whose services in West Virginia reference has already been made.

Congress ordered the enrolment of 500,000 volunteers for three years' service. It was a most difficult problem to organize and instruct, without proper *cadres*, such a mass of soldiers; but McClellan, who became Commander-in-Chief on the retirement of Scott, took the duty in hand, and he contrived to have ready for action, in Washington and the fortified places in its vicinity, no less than 190,000 men by the end of the year. This was the origin of the celebrated Federal Army of the Potomac, which, in spite of many reverses, and the tenacity and courage of its opponents, and the strategy of Lee, ultimately wore out the South. But how its operations were conducted in the year 1862 must be the subject of the next chapter.

II.

McCLELLAN IN THE YORK TOWN PENINSULA.

It was shown in the last chapter that General McClellan's successes in Western Virginia had so fascinated the public and the army that with universal consent President Lincoln committed to his hands the duty of restoring the shattered prestige of the North after the defeat of Bull Run.

His merits as a general are still the subject of much dispute; but it is clear that on at least two important occasions his efforts resulted in preserving his country in most serious crises, that he was a skilful organizer, that he was well versed in the science of war, and thoroughly at home in the details of administration. His strategy received the hearty praise of his ablest opponents long after it had ceased to trouble them, and his removal at last from the army, in which he was beloved, was due rather to the low cabals of the political schemers who controlled the Republican party of the North, and to the clamour of a most unfair but most powerful Press, than to any lack of energy or defect in capacity.

He is censured for over-caution; but a young army with untried officers is a weapon which requires thorough testing before being trustworthy. The scrupulous prudence of this "young Napoleon" was invidiously contrasted with the energy of him who descended from the Alps on the communications of Mélas; but when the army of the Potomac was entrusted to other hands the wire-pullers of the capital soon found that lack of prudence and success were far from synonymous. The soldiers who were pushed heedlessly to the front by Pope and Burnside and Hooker would have gladly exchanged their feverish activity for McClellan's cool wisdom.

It cannot be too often or too vigorously inculcated that statesmen should let strategists alone. The repeated defeats of the Austrians by the French in the end of last century and the beginning of this were largely due to the meddling of the Aulic Council. Had the Imperialists of Paris left MacMahon to himself France would not have had to deplore the disaster of Sedan, and the Eng-

lish in the Peninsula were more hampered by the Perceval Ministry and the Spanish juntas than by the pertinacity of Masséna and the manœuvring of Marmont. In America political knavery was the curse of the army as well as of the nation, and the Southern gentry were almost justified in breaking up the Union—deplorable as such a result would be—rather than submit to factious rings of corrupt and unscrupulous partisans.

The Federal Army of the Potomac was the creation of "Little Mac," as its members styled their leader. The only work of the kind at all resembling it was the organization by D'Aurelle de Paladines of the recruits, who, under the inspiration of Gambetta, tried to restore the fortunes of France after Sedan. To transform the myriads of undisciplined men who throng the camps in a crisis of national history into well-arranged armies is a task requiring the highest intellectual faculties as well as rare patience. Without a complete, and at the same time simple, organization a military force is an invertebrate mass of men in uniform without mobility —a mere waste of physical courage and national resources. It was not only the sturdy manhood and intense enthusiasm of the Puritans that defeated the gallant Cavaliers; it was the perfect discipline of Cromwell's New Model. The work done at the camp of Valley Forge enabled Washington to cope with the soldiers of Clinton and Cornwallis; the fierce hordes of the Jacobins developed into conquering armies, because of the system of divisions which expanded into the Corps of the Grand Army. But McClellan could boast of a greater feat than any of these, and his labours round the Federal capital, from the end of July, 1861, till the beginning of March, 1862, entitled him to the gratitude of his own country and the admiration of Europe.

The defeat at Bull Run or Manassas had turned the shallow joy and the exaggerated hopes of soldiers and civilians into gloom; all was insubordination and despair; the 50,000 troops who filled Washington streets were so demoralized and undisciplined as to be untrustworthy for even defensive purposes. The time of many had expired, and they were leaving their colours. Order was, however, soon evolved out of this chaos; the new commander bestirred himself, rigid discipline was enforced, brigades were organized under regular officers, and Washington was well fortified. Its defences consisted of a cordon of strong, independent forts, supporting each other, and extending on the south bank of the Potomac from below Alexandria, beyond Arlington Heights, to Chain Bridge above the capital. On the Maryland side the line continued from

the Potomac to the eastern branch road near Bladensburg, and thence along the heights south of the eastern branch road to a point nearly opposite Alexandria, making a circuit or total development of thirty-three miles. The maximum garrison was 34,000 men and 40 field guns.

The next thing, after securing the capital, which for political even more than strategic reasons was of first importance, was to procure an efficient field army of sufficient numbers to make a march on Richmond, even against 100,000 Confederates, a feasible operation. Let the artist describe his work. "Everything was to be created from the very foundation. Raw men and officers were to be instructed. The regular army was too small to furnish more than a portion of the general officers, and a very small portion of the staff, so that the staff departments and staff officers were to be fashioned mainly out of the intelligent and enthusiastic but perfectly raw material furnished. Artillery, small arms, and ammunition had to be fabricated or purchased from abroad; waggons, ambulances, bridges, trains, camp equipage, hospital stores, and all the vast *impedimenta* and material indispensable for an army in the field were to be manufactured. So great was the difficulty of procuring small arms that the armament of the infantry was not satisfactorily completed until the winter, and a large part of the field batteries were not ready until the spring of 1862." McClellan was very well assisted by subordinate officers, as Porter, Burnside, Casey, and, with regard to the artillery, by Barry, and the cavalry by Stoneman, and engineering by Barnard. He was able to report by October 27, 1861, an aggregate strength of 168,318 men; to this was in due time added a little reserve of the regulars of the old army, 4,600 strong, under general Sykes, which set a fine example of soldierly bearing and steadiness alike in camp and on the battle-field.

The General's plans were wide-reaching, and involved extensive preparations in the Western as well as Eastern theatre. He proposed in due time to strike at Nashville and some principal points on the coast, as well as at Richmond. While he marched into Virginia Buell was to operate in Eastern Kentucky, and Tennessee, on Nashville; Burnside was to occupy the coast of North Carolina; Sherman was to seize Savannah and regain Charleston, and Butler was to recover New Orleans.

The people, whose excitement became more intense after each parade of troops in their presence, were eager for action, but McClellan very wisely abstained from premature operations. He

quietly persisted in his preparations for securing ultimate and permanent success.

In dealing with the events of a war which spread over such a vast extent of territory as that under review, adherence to strict chronological order, attempts to write the annals just as they developed from day to day, result in such rapid and extensive geographical transitions as to be most confusing. It is, therefore, desirable to confine attention to certain sections of the war at a time, premising that the reader will remember that at the same period not less interesting events were in progress elsewhere, which will be considered in the order of their importance.

During the months in which McClellan was moulding the materials at his disposal into military shape Generals Johnston and Beauregard contented themselves with securing their positions along the southern side of the Potomac, replenishing their supplies, and reorganizing their forces, which had been almost as injuriously affected by victory as their foes were by defeat. Beauregard and many others were of opinion that a bold stroke after July 21, 1861, might have resulted in the ruin of the Federal cause, and General Joseph Johnston discusses this at length in his work, which is somewhat in the nature of a personal explanation. He and his president, Jefferson Davis, appear to have had little sympathy, and reciprocally attack each other in their treatises, but his reasons for not assuming a prompt offensive seem conclusive. He says "that his raw troops were unfit for marching or assailing intrenchments, that the necessary supplies of food and of means for transporting them were lacking, that the fortifications around Washington were now strong and manned by 50,000 men, and that on the Potomac, which was a mile wide, were United States men-of-war, the heavy guns of which commanded the wooden bridges and the southern shore."

In September it was hoped by the officers in command that the effective strength of their army might be so increased, by withdrawing troops from parts of the country not yet threatened, that they might make a bold attack on the Federal lines; but the Central Government would not consent to this, and practically the Confederate troops had to content themselves with drilling in their positions throughout the remainder of the year. The only important affair was Ball's Bluff, near Leesburg, where Evans's brigade repulsed with great loss an attack by the Federal Baker, killed him, and drove his troops in a panic over the river, in which hundreds were drowned (October 21). Occasional skirmishes, of

course, took place near Centreville between the two armies which were so close to each other. These were useful in making men accustomed to fire and difficulties of ground. From the end of December till the beginning of spring the condition of the country south of the Potomac and east of the Blue Ridge made manœuvring very difficult. The quantity of rain and snow put the roads in such a state that they were soon impassable from mud. Still the "rebels" kept up a very forward and bold appearance, their batteries threatened the navigation of the Potomac, and their flag, "the Stars and Bars," flaunted within sight of the Capitol. Nevertheless, through the "fall" and winter McClellan could not be tempted into the field, but contented himself with his work of making his army an effective military machine.

But President Lincoln and the new Secretary of War, Mr. Staunton, at the beginning of 1862 became very impatient, and began to insist on activity on the part of their generals; indeed, Mr. Lincoln went the length of suggesting a plan of campaign which would have delivered the army into the hands of its enemies. At last, on February 3, McClellan was obliged either to adopt the Government's advice and march on Centreville or propound his own scheme. He accordingly set forth that the best course was to descend the Potomac, enter the Rappahannock, land at Urbana for a base, and by a rapid march gain West Point at the head of the York River, and thus threaten Richmond before Johnston's army could fall back and resist his progress. In other words, he proposed to outflank the enemy far on his left, and suddenly turn the tables by making the vicinity of Richmond, and not Washington, the theatre of operations. He proposed to leave a sufficient force to protect Washington, and to bring with him a field army of 140,000 men. As for moving towards the Confederate position, he regarded such an idea as impracticable. An army must move by roads. Not even the genius of Napoleon could bring about a rapid advance over the Belgian territory after the heavy rains of June 17, 1815, and McClellan said, "The roads have gone from bad to worse. Nothing like their present condition was ever known here before; they are impassable at present. We are entirely at the mercy of the weather. It is by no means certain that we can beat them at Manassas. On the other line, I consider success certain by all the chances of war." A careful study of the theatre will show that McClellan was quite right; his only miscalculation was that in his front he supposed there was an army of 100,000 men—there were only at most 55,000.

On March 8 the Federal authorities agreed to this plan; but it so happened that General Johnston, on the other hand, had come to the conclusion, weeks before, that he would not be wise in standing at Centreville in the very probable event of his opponent taking this course, and had retired on a new line, the evacuation of Centreville being complete March 9. The Confederate commissariat had collected at Manassas 3,240,000 lbs. of stores, and in a great meat depôt at Thoroughfare Gap 2,000,000 lbs. of salt meat; some of this vast accumulation was taken with the army, part was distributed among the country people, and the remainder was destroyed by General Stuart's cavalry, who covered the withdrawal of the army. On March 11 all the infantry and artillery crossed the Rappahannock, two divisions encamped near the river, two divisions near Culpeper, and the cavalry occupied Warrenton Junction; the headquarters were at the Rappahannock station, south of the river. It became also very evident that the Shenandoah Valley could not be held by General "Stonewall" Jackson against the very superior forces of the Federals, under Banks, now sent there, and he fell back to Winchester, and thence to Strasburg, and thence to Mount Jackson (March 16). About the same time Johnston still further retired behind the Rapidan, and encamped between Orange Court House and the railway bridge, where he had a better position for combined movements with any forces at Richmond and in the peninsula formed by the York and James rivers.

As the enemy had fallen back behind the Rappahannock the scheme of dislodging them by operating against their right flank was no longer of any value, and a new plan was resolved upon at a council of war composed of the four commanders of the corps into which, against McClellan's judgment, his army was divided. Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes agreed to make Fort Monroe on the York town peninsula their base, and to move thence direct on Richmond, leaving a force to cover Washington, and having the use of the navy to silence the hostile batteries on the York river; the line of operations was to be from York Town and West Point upon Richmond, *i.e.*, the main army was to move up the peninsula with the co-operation of the navy on the rivers, while a powerful column, over 40,000 strong, was to operate upon the right, on either bank of the York, to turn the enemy's positions, should they offer any resistance on the direct route.

The operations commenced with a march on Centreville, a mere

movement calculated to rid the army of useless baggage and fit it for embarkation to a new base, but valuable as showing the difficulties of real campaigning, which seemed so trifling to partisan editors.

The troops, when they reached the deserted positions, found a strong line of earthworks, the *débris* of camps, and some "Quaker" guns, or trunks of trees so hewn as to bear in the distance a resemblance to cannon. The mass of the army returned to prepare for embarkation, and General McDowell was left to occupy the enemy; he followed them closely as far as Warrenton Junction, and then made a forced march to the Rappahannock, arriving at Fredericksburg April 17.

We have now reached the epoch of the celebrated Peninsular campaign, which was so fruitful of lessons in almost every principle of the art of war, and in which the officers engaged displayed the most versatile abilities, and in some cases rare genius, and the troops on both sides manifested a stomach for good hard fighting, an amount of vigour in attack, and of steadiness in retreat, which did the utmost credit to their hereditary qualities and to their very short military training. It began April 2, by the arrival of General McClellan at Fort Monroe, and it practically concluded July 2, when he secured his position at Harrison's Landing after his remarkable retreat from the Chickahominy, his well-known, and, on the whole, brilliant "strategic movement to the rear."

But the result of the campaign was a bitter disappointment to the North. Richmond was not taken; on the contrary, partly owing to the fortunes of war, and partly because of the perversity of politicians, the Federal cause was in a far worse state at the end than in the beginning of the year.

The Federal force amounted to some 120,000 men and 240 field-pieces, and it was afterwards joined by Franklin's division of McDowell's corps 12,000 strong; but McClellan says he had not more than about 53,000 available for fighting when he started on his movement from his new base.

To General Magruder the Confederates entrusted the task of delaying his march, while the troops at Gordonsville under General Johnston moved on Richmond to defend the capital, and General Jackson remained in the valley, and Ewell on the Upper Rappahannock. General Magruder's defence of the peninsula was really a splendid example of the proper use of a detaining force. With only about 8,000 men, afterwards reinforced to 13,000, he so

hampered his opponents as to give the other Confederate troops an opportunity of concentrating. He was a trained West Point soldier of considerable experience; an old hand at "making a clatter" to keep up appearances, whether at the mess-table or in the battle-field. Notwithstanding the vein of eccentricity in his character, his defence of the territory between the James and the York reminds us of the remarkable lines between the Tagus and the sea, whereby Wellington stopped Masséna in 1810.

He laid out three defensive lines across the peninsula, from Williamsburg down towards Fort Monroe. His first was seven miles below York Town. Here the Poquosin creek, from the York and the Warwick rivers flowing into the James, narrows the solid ground to three miles. Both flanks were protected by boggy and difficult swamps, and there were woods in the centre. This line he had fortified, but, as he had not enough men to hold it, he fell back to his second line, running from York Town, on his left, along the Warwick river to Mulberry Island, and the James upon the right. The works at Gloucester and York Town were expected to close the river to Union gun-boats; and, indeed, the Federal army received little assistance from its fleet, which was kept very busy by the celebrated *Merrimac*, or *Virginia*, an old frigate which had been turned into an ironclad, and commanded the mouth of the James, and destroyed some and engaged others of the ships in Hampton Roads, till the Confederates blew it up when they were obliged to evacuate Norfolk. The third line was at Williamsburg, eleven miles further up the peninsula. In his scheme of defence Magruder included the old British works used in 1781, and availed himself of mill-dams, bogs, and every other natural feature that could be turned into an obstacle.

McClellan did not know of these works, and he had to deplore the lack of a good Intelligence Department at Washington, for the maps with which he was supplied did him more harm than good. It must be remembered, in criticizing the operations of officers in this war, that the situation was very different from that in Europe, where most accurate topographical descriptions of every section of the theatre of war are ready, so that he who runs can read the state of the country, whereas careful surveys of many parts of the States were never made, and the peninsula was "a *terra incognita* for military purposes."

While thus delayed and disappointed in his expectations of efficient support from the navy McClellan was doomed to further surprise of a still more trying character. On the very day,

April 5, when he learned that the Warwick river was a considerable obstruction, he also was informed that the President, who feared for the safety of Washington, had resolved to withhold McDowell's corps, on which, as has been shown, he relied for the flanking movements to dislodge the enemy. This proceeding on Mr. Lincoln's part—deliberately spoiling a general's plan of campaign—was quite unjustifiable, and is enough to explain the disasters that ensued, irrespective of any further political shuffling and blundering. As General Webb very properly says, "If McClellan was still retained, one duty was incumbent on the government, it should have suffered at least one half of McDowell's corps to proceed to the peninsula at once, and then made every effort to reinforce the capital from other points. To allow the general to remain in command and then cut off the very arm with which he was about to strike we hold to have been inexcusable and unmilitary to the last degree." Indeed, their absurd anxiety about the safety of themselves and their capital was a snare to the Federal politicians throughout. The general might with propriety have resigned at once, but he preferred to remain at his post. But he seems to have been at fault in allowing Magruder to delay him so long, for he might have forced the works in his front before Magruder was reinforced by Johnston. Indeed the latter general at a council of war had proposed a concentration of troops from all parts near Richmond, and the evacuation of the peninsula and Norfolk, and then an attack on McClellan as he was following up Magruder, which might cut him off from his long line of communications (Fort Monroe to Richmond [illegible] miles); but Mr. Davis and Lee were in favour of keeping a forward position as long as possible; hence, two able subordinate officers, Hill and Longstreet, and Johnston himself were soon assisting in the operations.

McClellan was delayed a month on the second line. He resorted to siege operations to gain possession of York Town; all the batteries would have been ready to open fire on it on the 5th of May, and the men were prepared for an assault; but it was evacuated on the night of the 3rd, and the Confederates took up a position on their third line at Williamsburg, followed by the Union forces, who fought a stiff action on the 6th, without much of a plan, in which their General, Hancock, distinguished himself against Longstreet; but they lost 2,000 men. At night the enemy abandoned Williamsburg and continued their retreat towards Richmond, Magruder leading. It will be noted that night marches,

both of advance and retreat, were a leading feature in this war, and were conducted with rare skill.

In deference to his urgent request, McClellan was now reinforced by Franklin, of McDowell's corps; this officer set out from York Town May 6, and reached Eltham landing, above West Point, where he disembarked his troops and was attacked (7th) by a few Confederate brigades who wished to protect their trains at Barhamsville.

The Federals pursued after the engagement at Williamsburg very slowly, owing to there being few roads, and these in a wretched condition; in two weeks they concentrated between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy. On May 16 a permanent depot was organized at White House (Williamsburg to White House twenty-five miles), and the army faced towards Richmond, only twenty-two miles distant. But a most active enemy and a serious river obstacle intervened. Porter was on the right, near New Bridge (seven miles from Richmond), then came Franklin, Sumner, and Keyes, who was on the left near Bottom's Bridge, with Heintzelman in reserve; Stoneman and the cavalry watched the extreme right within a mile of New Bridge.

Now, why did McClellan keep his base on the York, since the enemy had abandoned Norfolk and burned the *Merrimac* (May 11), and the James was available—and he unquestionably preferred the James? The answer is to be found in a long correspondence between him and the President, at the close of which the latter gave him to understand that, after all, McDowell's force of 41,000 men and 100 guns from Fredericksburg would drive away the small force under Anderson in his front, and advance to co-operate with the main army, leaving Shields behind him to watch the line of the Rappahannock. McDowell was to advance May 26, and it was with the view of keeping touch with him that General Fitz-John Porter with 12,000 men was sent to clear the Upper Peninsula of the enemy as far as Hanover Court House (seventeen miles north of Richmond), and beyond it, and to destroy the bridges over the South Anna and Pamunkey rivers, in order to prevent the enemy in large force from getting into the rear from that direction, and further to cut the railway line from Richmond into Northern Virginia. It rained heavily, and the roads were in a terrible condition. An action occurred near Hanover Court House May 27, in which the Confederate General Branch was routed, and everything was cleared for McDowell's advance, and had he been permitted to come south there is reason to believe that McClellan


Map of the
YORK TOWN PENINSULA
Scale of Miles
5 0 5 10 15 20
Hanover C.H.
Hanover
King William C.H.
Mattapony R.
Pamunkey R.
Totopotomy R.
Mechanics V.
Ashland
Meadows
Gaines Mill
Cold Harbour
Chickahominy R.
White House
West Point
Fair Oaks
Savall Sta
Slatersville
New Kent C.H.
RICHMOND
Allen
Seven Pines
Bottom Br.
Long Br.
Jones Br.
White Oak Swamp
Glendale
Newmarket
Malvern
Chaffin's
Haxall
Fort Darling
Drury Junct.
Bermuda Hundred
City Pt.
Harrison Landing
Ft Powhattan
Charles City C.H.
Williamsburg
Fort Magruder
Queens Creek
Gloucester
Yorktown
York River
Chesapeake Bay
Walthall
James River
Light House Pt
Lee's Mill
Howards
Young's Mill
Petersburg
Appomatox R.
Hampton
Newport News
Ft Munroe
Norfolk
SOUTH SIDE RAILWAY
WELDON RAILWAY
NORFOLK RAILWAY
FREDERICKSBURG RAILWAY
VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILWAY

T M M. del

would have been in Richmond in the beginning of June. But the terror which Jackson's remarkable operations in the Shenandoah Valley inspired in Washington caused McDowell to be again withheld just as McClellan crossed the Chickahominy, and this was fatal to the campaign.

The advance on Richmond continued with 126,089 men and 280 pieces of field artillery. The 4th Corps (Keyes) crossed the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge and took up a position at the Seven Pines, five miles from Richmond; the 3rd Corps (Heintzelman) followed; on the left bank were Sumner, Franklin, and Porter; the last two officers had recently received corps commands. The passage of the river was a very serious matter, and it was necessary for the army to be astride the river, in order to be able to communicate with McDowell if by any chance he should arrive on the scene, and also to maintain connection with the base of supply at White House. Let the General-in-Chief describe the passage:—

> Our operations were for the most part between Meadow and Bottom's Bridges, covering the approaches to Richmond from the east. Here the river at its ordinary stage is some forty feet wide, fringed with a dense growth of heavy forest trees, and bordered by low, marshy lands, varying from half a mile to a mile in width. Within the limits above mentioned the firm ground above high-water mark seldom approaches the river on either bank, and in no place did the high ground come near the stream on both banks. It was subject to frequent sudden and great variations in the volume of water, and a single violent storm of brief duration sufficed to cause an overflow of the bottom lands for many days, rendering the river absolutely impassable without long and strong bridges. When we reached the river it was found that all the bridges, except that at Mechanicsville, had been destroyed. The right bank, opposite New Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridges, was bordered by high bluffs, affording the enemy commanding positions for his batteries, enfilading the approaches, and preventing the rebuilding of important bridges.

Under these conditions it was creditable that the Federals succeeded in crossing at all, and maintaining connection between the separated parts of their army; and it is no wonder that soldiers, who were toiling up to their waists through quagmires in tremendous storms, should be indignant at the cool sneers of wire-pullers and caucus folk in New York and Washington who grumbled at their slowness.

The bridges over the Chickahominy first built were swept away by the floods, and it became necessary to construct others more solid and with long log (*corduroy*) approaches, a slow and difficult task, generally carried on by men working in the water and under fire.

During the night of the 30th torrents of rain fell, and the Federal troops began the battle of Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks, in as bad a condition as the French on the morning of Waterloo. As General Keyes said: "From their beds of mud and the peltings of this storm the 4th Corps rose to fight the battle of May 31." Johnston very wisely resolved to take advantage of all their distresses, and to destroy them in detail, although the whole Confederate force could not have amounted to more than 55,000 men. This was an obstinately contested engagement, the principal officers of the attack under Johnston being Huger, Hill, Longstreet, and Smith. Four Federal divisions held out gallantly till Sumner crossed the river, with great difficulty, to their aid, and checked the enemy, notwithstanding their desperate rushes up to the bayonets and the muzzles of the guns. When night closed the combat, friends and foes, scattered through the woods, snatched a brief repose among heaps of dead and wounded, till in the morning the struggle was renewed; but Johnston's attacks were again repulsed. The result of the battle was undecisive from the point of view of tactics. Each army practically was as before. The Federals lost about 6,000 men, and the Confederates 8,000; but strategically the advantage was with the South. McClellan was foiled: he could not push on; he could not yet bring Porter and Franklin to the right bank, and he began to think seriously of a new base, and ordered transports with supplies of all kinds, protected by gunboats, up the James. He constructed works about five miles long, right and left of Fair Oaks; he laid down more bridges and covered them by *têtes de pont*, and it was not till June 25 that he felt free to attack again; meanwhile he had been reinforced by McCall's division, which, with Porter, was left north of the Chickahominy, while General Franklin went south of it.

About sunset of May 31 General J. Johnston, who had been shortly before wounded by a bullet in the shoulder, was struck from his horse by a shell and severely injured. His place was taken by G. W. Smith till July 2, when General Robert E. Lee was placed in command of the army of Virginia. This very distinguished officer, a Christian gentleman of rare gentleness of character, as well as a brave soldier of dauntless courage and absolute serenity in the midst of battle, was destined to be ranked amongst the greatest leaders of modern war. He was born in 1807 at Stratford, in Westmoreland County, Virginia, and was of a good family, son of General "Light Horse Harry" Lee, a very able coadjutor of Washington during the War of Independence. He

entered the excellent military academy at West Point 1825, and graduated 1829, joining the Engineers. He differed very much from the great Corsican strategist as being "in sooth a perfect gentle knight" from his early manhood, as well as distinguished for the elegance and dignity of his person. He married the daughter of Washington's adopted son, and thus acquired the estates of Arlington and White House, both well known in the war. He became captain in 1838, and in 1846 was chief engineer of the Central Army of Mexico, where he impressed very favourably General Scott. He was wounded at Chapultepec, and then he became colonel. After the peace he was entrusted with important engineering works at Hampton Roads and elsewhere. In 1855 he was made lieutenant-colonel of the 2nd Cavalry, which became the *corps d'élite* of the United States service. He suppressed the revolt of the fanatic Brown at Harper's Ferry 1859. He then took charge of the Texas frontier, and came to Washington at the outbreak of the secession movement. Every effort was made to induce him to join the Federal side; but he thought it his duty to adhere to Virginia, his native State. For this he abandoned the highest prospects in the North and his beautiful home at Arlington, went to Richmond, and was appointed to the chief command in the State army. During the early operations of the war he was engaged at Richmond putting it in a posture of defence. He then went for some time to Western Virginia, where he conducted some Fabian operations, and thence, after some duty in connection with defences in South Carolina, came back to Richmond in the spring of 1862.

It was now his task to cope with any further designs of the Federals in his front; but, leaving him to prepare his plans, we turn to the operations of General Jackson, which have already been referred to as causing the Washington authorities to deprive McClellan of the help of McDowell.

Certainly General Jackson was a worthy assistant for Lee. He was a man of boundless resources, a consummate master of military *finesse*, as fond of stratagem as Hannibal or Marlborough, secret in council, rapid in execution, bold and cautious, unmoved by danger, which indeed could not well trouble a rigid Presbyterian of the old Covenanting type. He was a man of prayer, who joined the South after praying for hours along with his father-in-law, who wished him to join the North; his greatest friend and only trusted adviser in all his campaigns was the Rev. R. Dabney, a Presbyterian minister. In all the details of war, holding the enemy, withdrawing

unobserved, tenacity in fights, surprises, skilful marches, flank movements, ingenious treatment of obstacles, he was unrivalled; but he cannot be reckoned among the highest masters of his art as was Lee. Born in 1824, educated at West Point, where he was remarkable for homely dress, uncouth manners, and industry, he served in the Mexican war, where he was noticed as a good gunner. He was Professor of Chemistry for some years at the Military College at Lexington, Virginia. When on a tour in Europe he derived most pleasure from visiting English cathedrals.

We have already discussed his very valuable services in the campaign of 1861, and seen how he was obliged to comply with the general backward movement of the Confederates in the spring of 1862. But while retiring he turned on Banks, who had charge of the Federal forces in the northern part of the valley, and had an action at Kernstown, near Woodstock, March 23, in which, however, he was repulsed, and then he retired south again. In the beginning of May the valley was threatened by the Federals from all sides. Milroy, with nearly 12,000 men, was on the Staunton and Parkersburg Road at McDowell, less than forty miles from Staunton. Fremont, with 30,000 men, was at Franklin. Banks was fortified with 10,000 men at Strasburg, seventy miles northeast of Staunton. Shields was on the east side of the Blue Ridge, so as to be able to move either to Fredericksburg or to the Luray valley. McDowell was at Fredericksburg with the army aforesaid. And now began a series of operations, the most brilliant of their kind since Napoleon fell upon the scattered sections of Blucher's army at Champaubert and Montmirail in 1814.

Suddenly Jackson evacuated the valley and went east of the Blue Ridge, leaving behind him only Ashby, with 1,000 cavalry, who reconnoitred towards the various hostile forces. The men were entrained at Charlottesville, and thought they were going to Richmond, when, to their amazement, they were brought back into the valley and occupied Staunton. On May 8 Milroy was beaten on the top of a mountain three miles east of McDowell (not to be confounded with the General), and driven to Franklin to join with Fremont. Jackson marched north to Harrisonburg and then to Newmarket, and thence over the mountains to Front Royal, where, May 23, he surprised Banks' detachments and drove them in full flight to Winchester. As this threatened Banks' line he evacuated the Strasburg works, but was caught in flank at Newton, May 24, and being utterly routed, with an enormous loss of stores and arms, as well as prisoners, retired north to the Potomac. He

was nicknamed Jackson's commissary. Fremont now advanced to Staunton to hem in the enemy, but was stopped by a small force at Brock's Gap, and took the road by Moorfield to Strasburg, which place Jackson, returning from Winchester, reached before him. Fremont followed, and Shields was ordered into the valley by Luray. The Confederate general had now to beat these in detail, so he sent cavalry towards the latter on the Shenandoah river, and advancing north to Cross Keys, near Harrisonburg, defeated Fremont, June 8, and, leaving Ewell's brigade to watch him, marched to Fort Republic, where he quickly disposed of Shields, June 9. In thirty-five days he had marched 245 miles, and won four desperate battles. His celerity of movement gave his troops the name of "foot cavalry." But as one of his best known subordinates, Imboden, says, "He never broke down his men by too long continued marching. He rested the whole column very often, but only for a few minutes at a time, and he liked to see the men lie down flat on the ground to rest, saying, "a man rests all over when he lies down."

On June 17 he evacuated the valley with the utmost secrecy, and moved south-east, while the people at Washington were expecting an attack on the capital, and displaying both timidity and uncertainty in their counsels. Up to this date, therefore, it is clear that the superiority in strategic ability was entirely with the Confederates; the combinations of Magruder, Johnston, and Jackson were all fine lessons in every variety of manœuvring, and Lee and Jackson were for the remainder of their careers together about to illustrate the very highest conceptions of their art by turning movements of the rarest daring and skill and successful support of each other after the most hazardous separation.

Lee now resolved, if possible, to attack and defeat the Federal army by moving against its divisions north of the Chickahominy, and cutting it off from its base at White House. To attack the left wing on the south of the river would be vain, as the thickets of the White Oak Swamp were a natural defence, and, in addition, protection was secured by felled trees, and every approach by the roads leading from the capital was blocked by redoubts full of heavy artillery. The position at Seven Pines was also very carefully fortified, and bristled with artillery; therefore it was most expedient to attack on the right, if there were no defences of much strength in that direction. With the object of ascertaining how things stood in this respect, General Stuart set out on one of those memorable raids which have taught European horsemen a

leading function of cavalry in modern warfare. We have now reached the era in which all the preliminaries, as it were, of the war were complete. Both sides, from May, 1862, settled down to their work; both armies were full of men who were becoming adepts at their business, and there was no flagging in the interest, and no pause in the tremendous struggle till Richmond surrendered in 1865. Moreover, new officers of merit, and many of them of surpassing abilities, were appearing on both sides, each of whom would deserve a treatise to himself, and who certainly earned the tributes of literary gratitude which are so lavishly paid to them in America.

Of these, one of the most romantic characters, General James Stuart, was born 1835, and educated at West Point Academy, where he graduated 1854. In 1857 he was severely wounded in an engagement with the Cheyenne Indians; and in 1860 was promoted captain; in 1861 he was most useful to Joseph Johnson in the Bull Run campaign. Like Murat, he was very fond of the pomp and pageantry of war; he loved jest and laughter; he had a banjo-player following him frequently; he wore a splendid hat with a long floating plume, and in every respect was a singular and bold character. He was of the medium height, but very strong and muscular, and wore a heavy brown beard flowing upon his breast, and a huge moustache with the ends curling upwards. He would have made a fine soldier of fortune during the epoch of the Thirty Years' War; as it was, General Sedgwick said very truly, "he was the best cavalry officer ever *foaled* in America." He undertook to inspect McClellan's right flank, and did so thoroughly. He started with about 1,500 picked troopers, drove in the enemy's outposts from Hanover Court House, charged and broke a force of Federal cavalry near Old Church, pushed on to the York River railroad, which he crossed, burning or capturing all Federal stores that he met with, including enormous waggon camps, and then, finding the way barred against him, and the Federal army on the look-out for him, he passed rapidly entirely round McClellan's army, and, building a bridge over the Chickahominy, safely re-entered the Confederate lines, and reported to Lee that there was no serious obstacle to an attack north of the river.

Lee now called Jackson to his aid, while by the clever *ruse* of putting some troops in trains for Lynchburg he led the enemy to believe that he was himself reinforcing Jackson. The latter moved rapidly to his superior, concealing his object from everyone except his reverend adviser. His troops were ordered not to inquire the names of the places they passed through, and to reply

"I don't know" to every question. Cooke says that when the General demanded the name and regiment of a soldier who was robbing a cherry-tree, the only answer he could get was "I don't know." Jackson reached Ashland June 25, and forthwith set out to consult with Lee at his head-quarters near Richmond. Lee's design was to attack the Federal right wing, north of the Chickahominy, with a part of his force, while Jackson, advancing still further to the left, cut in on their communications with White House, and assailed them on their right and rear. Meanwhile, Magruder was to protect Richmond with 25,000 men on the south bank; if McClellan fell back down the Peninsula, this force was to cross and unite with the rest.

On the other hand, McClellan occupied the passages of the Chickahominy already referred to, and could concentrate on either his left or right, as seemed more desirable. If the Confederates assailed his left he could fall back on White House; but if they turned his right, he could go south of the Chickahominy to some new base on the James, making, of course, feints to induce Lee to believe that he was still desirous of maintaining his old line. Such were the strategical conditions under which the battles of the Seven Days took place, a most desperate struggle, reminding one of the very fiercest fights of the Napoleonic era, as, for example, the campaign of 1809 or 1813. The Confederate attacks were most resolute, pushed home with unflinching enthusiasm. On the other hand, McClellan's management of his retreat was one of the finest displays of military skill in the most difficult of operations, changing base and retiring by a flank march with enormous encumbrances in face of an eager and vigilant enemy.

On the 26th June the Confederate General A. P. Hill moved to Meadow Bridge, north of Richmond, and crossed and advanced on Mechanicsville, driving away the enemy from the bridge there. Longstreet crossed then, and Hill continued his movement till he was stopped by the formidable works at Beaver Dam Creek; not even the spirit of the Southern gentry and their rushes with awe-inspiring "yells" availed against a flank fire by cannon from a bluff and rifle fire from pits. Hill was checked, but tried again lower down the stream next morning, and found that the enemy had fallen back: they had learned that Jackson was turning their flank, and Porter was to take a position nearer the passage of the river between New Bridge and Bottom's Bridge, and hold out till the night of the 27th. Hill followed him, and at noon came upon a very strong position at Gaines' Mill, near Cold Harbour, which

before night was one of the bloodiest battle-fields since Waterloo. It will be observed by students of this war that the spade and the axe were used at least as freely as the sword and rifle. The first care of an American leader, like an old Roman's, was to entrench his post. In front the whole line of battle, which was a curve to cover the bridges, was protected by difficult approaches. The ground was swampy, and abounded in tangled undergrowth. The ridge held by the Federal forces had also been hastily fortified by felled trees and earth, behind which the infantry, supported by numerous artillery, stood firm. FitzJohn Porter was in command; he was reinforced in the afternoon by Slocum and the brigade of French and the Irish brigade of Meagher, which distinguished itself by courage where all were brave. Hill led his men up to a hand-to-hand fight; he had Longstreet on his right, and both were under the eye of Lee, who was as serene in an action as that angel of the storm to whom Addison compared Marlborough, and

> Amidst confusion, horror, and despair,
> Examined all the dreadful scenes of war;
> In peaceful thought the field of death surveyed,
> To fainting squadrons sent the timely aid,
> Inspired repulsed battalions to engage,
> And taught the doubtful battle where to rage.

After fighting from 12 till 2 Hill found that he had made no progress. Lonstreet now made a feint against the Federal left, and thus relieved his comrade; but he soon was obliged to make a real attack, which would have produced little effect, only that Jackson's men began to arrive. Taking instructions from Lee, they joined in a new advance of the whole line at about 5:30; a furious encounter ensued. "The enemy was driven from the ravine to the line of breastworks, over which the impetuous columns dashed up to the entrenchments on the crest." The Federals fell back now, and it was in vain that their officers tried to stop them. They retired in a business-like manner, like men who felt that they had done quite enough. For this they have been censured; but they appear to have conducted themselves at least as well as most European armies under similar conditions.

By way of illustrating the extreme difficulty of attaining accuracy as to figures in describing these battles it may be remarked that General D. H. Hill says there were 50,000 Confederates to 40,000 Federals at this engagement, while an equally distinguished officer, General Porter, gives 65,000 and 27,000 respectively, a very material discrepancy. Of the Federal artil-

lery more than twenty very fine guns were taken, and they retired by night over the Gravepine Bridge and down the Williamsburg Road towards the White Oak Swamp.

Now McClellan's coolness and decision, as well as perfect command over his men, saved the army from being broken to pieces, if not compelled to surrender at discretion. There can be no doubt that the Confederate generals regarded his escape as impossible. Jackson and Stuart kept on the north of the Chickahominy, and the latter went as far as White House, where he captured an immense booty, which there had been no time to destroy, although General Casey, who commanded the Federals, had done his best to leave little behind him, one of his devices being to put the railway engines and carriages laden with supplies under a full pressure of steam and send them headlong into the river over the broken bridge.

Magruder and Huger, south of the river, were in a position to interrupt the movement towards the James, and could be supported by Longstreet and A. P. Hill. McClellan also destroyed vast quantities of stores in his works towards Richmond before leaving them. The Confederates found a regular mound of stores on fire near Seven Pines, 30 feet high and 60 feet broad, consisting of sugar, coffee, bacon, butter, prepared meat, vegetables, &c. Such is the wastefulness of war; indeed, this Civil War illustrates its evils as well as compensations on a colossal scale.

The fields and woods were covered with every description of clothing and camp equipage, of which there had been lavish abundance, and in regard to which much carelessness had prevailed among the Northern troops. "Blue coats lined the earth like leaves in Vallombrosa." Still enough materials were brought away to fill at least 5,000 waggons, all the heavy guns were removed, and a herd of 2,500 oxen cheered the soldiers by a prospect of food, even if they encumbered the only road available. While Lee was uncertain as to his movements the Federal leader gained a couple of days for the withdrawal of his trains. He was sure, if he could only manage these, that he could bring away his army safely.

On the night of the 27th the corps commanders were assembled, and learned his plans. Orders were issued to General Keyes to move with his corps across the White Oak Swamp Bridge, and take up a position with his artillery on the opposite side, and cover the passage of the rest of the troops; the trains and supplies at Savage Station on the York River railroad were directed to be

withdrawn, and the whole army was ordered to move with such provisions and sick as it could carry to Harrison's Landing. The wounded were left on the field. Of course the great obstacle to the success of this movement was the nature of the country. The engineers did all they could to facilitate the movement through the White Oak Swamp, where the only passages were narrow, winding, and difficult roads, almost impracticable for guns and rugged enough for men.

By the morning of the 29th the design of the enemy became apparent to the Confederate officers, and Lee issued orders for pursuit. General Magruder attacked the rear-guard, under Sumner, on the 29th at Savage Station; but his three attacks were repulsed. Soon afterwards an assault was made on Franklin by the Williamsburg road, and fighting continued till 9 P.M. Porter followed Keyes towards the new base; Heintzelman followed next. The trains were pushed on in rear of the leading corps, and massed under cover of the gun-boats as soon as they reached the James. The rear-guard crossed the swamp in the night, destroying all the bridges at 5 A.M. of the 30th. The troops were now disposed to hold during the day all the roads by which the enemy could advance from Richmond to strike the line of march. The Confederates saw clearly that their prey was slipping from their grasp, and attacked again and again. They tried to force the swamp, crossing in face of Franklin, who held back Jackson, who ought to have been much more decided in his movements at this date than he was. Indeed, General D. H. Hill admits that Franklin was not pressed as he ought to have been. Had Jackson acted more vigorously the assaults by the other Confederate officers on the Union left flank would have had a better chance of success. His friend Dabney says, "The temporary eclipse of Jackson's genius was probably due to physical causes. The labour of the previous days, the sleeplessness, the wear of gigantic cares, with the drenching of the comfortless night, had sunk the elasticity of his will and the quickness of his invention for the nonce." On the other hand, Franklin thus speaks of his men: "During the whole time between June 26 and July 2 there was not a night in which my men did not march continuously, nor a day on which there was not a fight. They had no food but what they carried in their haversacks, and the hot weather rendered that uneatable. Sleep was out of the question, and the only rest obtained was lying down awaiting an attack, or sheltering themselves from shot and shell. They had been soldiers for less than a

year." Huger assailed the Union troops down the Charles City Road, while Longstreet and A. P. Hill, crossing at New Bridge, went along the Long Bridge Road to Frayser's farm or Glendale, and fell on Slocum, McCall, Kearney, and Hooker in vain. From the character of the ground little could be accomplished; the Confederates came on with wild yells in repeated rushes; but their attempts were repulsed all day, and during the night the enemy quietly fell back to a new position at Malvern, which they occupied on the morning of July 1. The 30th was the critical day, and on it the Federals repelled three distinct attacks on flank and rear. Colonel Chesney is mistaken in his view that Longstreet and Hill attacked from the direction of Long Bridge.

Nothing could be more admirable than the tactical ability displayed by McClellan in his defence of the Malvern position; his troops were disposed in the form of a huge semicircle, its wings resting on the river, with the right at Haxall's. Batteries of 20 and 32-pounders of rifled and Napoleon guns commanded every avenue of approach, and Porter had sixty massed guns with a converging fire. Beneath the guns, on the slope of the hill, were the infantry calmly waiting attack. Lee's artillery was very weak in comparison; all the efforts of the brave commanders before referred to were wasted. D. H. Hill and Magruder particularly distinguished themselves. But what could they do? To quote Hill, "As each brigade emerged from the woods from fifty to one hundred guns opened upon it, tearing great gaps in its ranks; but the heroes reeled on, and were shot down by the reserves at the guns which a few squads reached. Most of them had an open field half a mile wide to cross, and this under the terrible fire of field artillery in front, and the fire of the heavy ordnance of the gun-boats in their rear. It was not war—it was murder; even troops which were brought up too late to be of any use met with many casualties from the fearful artillery fire which reached all parts of the woods for miles round. More than half the casualties were from the field pieces, an unprecedented thing in warfare."

On the next morning McClellan had disappeared towards Harrison's Landing, and reached it without any serious interruption. Lee says, "The Federal commander immediately began to fortify his position, which was one of great natural strength, flanked on each side by a creek, and the approach to his front commanded by the heavy guns of his shipping, in addition to those mounted in his entrenchments. It was deemed inexpedient to attack him, and in view of the condition of our troops, who had been march-

ing and fighting almost incessantly for seven days under the most trying circumstances, it was determined to withdraw, in order to afford them the repose of which they stood so much in need."

The losses on each side were very considerable; McClellan estimated his at 15,249 men and 25 guns in the seven days, but this is probably much under the number. Lee's losses were about 19,000.

It is quite clear that on the 27th, when the Confederates marched on Gaines' Mill, McClellan might have driven Magruder before him and entered Richmond. Of course this would have been a very bold move, and would have risked all his communications; but, if liable to severe criticism in the opinion of many for neglecting this opportunity, his retreat is admitted to be one of the very ablest changes of base by a flank movement ever made in war, and will compare favourably with either Sir J. Moore's movement from the Carrion to Corunna, 1808–9, or Masséna's movements from Santarem to Celerico, 1811. "And now," says General Webb, "what saved the Army of the Potomac from other disasters than that consequent upon a forced change of base? It was the perfection of its organization, which was due to the personal affection entertained for General McClellan by the officers and men of his army."

We leave the Federals at Harrison's Landing, and the Confederates in Richmond, which their skill and valour had saved.

The next chapter will set forth how the posture of affairs was reversed, and the theatre of war transferred from Southern to Northern territory.

III.

POPE'S OPERATIONS: LEE IN MARYLAND.

The advantages from a military point of view of the command of the sea have been apparent in all ages. The opinion of Themistocles, that he who is master of the sea is master of the situation, is expressed also in Bacon's celebrated phrase, "the command of the sea is an abridgment of monarchy"; its possessor can take as much or as little of the war as he pleases. Our people have experienced this truth in many a serious crisis in the development of their Empire, notably during the Napoleonic wars, and their maritime superiority gave the Federals all the advantages of a re-entering frontier as against Virginia, and highways into the very centre of the Confederacy by means of the great rivers. After the Seven Days the James River furnished McClellan with a new base, covered by the powerful artillery of the gun-boats, so strong that Lee thought it useless to attack, and withdrew his troops behind the works of his capital. The Federal commander was very far from having lost confidence in the offensive strength of his still powerful army, and, if his counsels had been hearkened to, he would probably have finished the war before the close of the year. But the politicians of Washington again interfered with ruinous consequences, and wasted with disgraceful folly and treachery the lives and fortunes of citizens who mistook the selfish cunning of intriguers for the lofty wisdom of honourable statesmen. Nevertheless the patriotism of the North responded to every call; a new levy of 300,000 men supplied the vacancies of death and disease, and a lavish use of the national credit filled the camps with abundance of the means of living and the instruments of destruction.

If, as Montecuculi and many others have said, money is the first, second, and third thing in war, the South would have perished at once. But it would appear that neither men nor money are of any avail under the ordinary conditions of government by mere counting of heads. The Federal National Debt on July 1st reached

1,222,000,000 dollars, and was rapidly increasing; in fact, no expenditure was grudged by the people, but, as far as the armies in Virginia were concerned, all was squandered in vain. The politicians resolved to get rid of McClellan, not because of his failures, but because of his merits in wishing to wage war as a soldier and gentleman, and in refusing to become a mere tool of their factions. They selected as Commander-in-Chief H. W. Halleck (July 11th), who was more likely to become subservient to their views. This officer was born in 1819, and educated at West Point, from which he passed into the Engineers. He was an author of distinction, but he had retired from the service, and with that versatility in regard to professions which is so characteristic of America, was practising as a lawyer in San Francisco when the war began. He discarded the gown for the sword, and in March, 1862, was appointed head of the military department of the Mississippi. From this post he was now called to be nominally responsible for the military policy of his country. Another very important change in the posture of affairs took place in the same month. General John Pope took command (July 14) of the forces which had occupied the Shenandoah Valley and the line of the Rappahannock, under McDowell, Banks, and Fremont. The latter leader, who was both ambitious and turbulent, retired in chagrin, and his place was taken by Sigel, a German officer of considerable experience. Pope had left West Point in 1842; he had served in Mexico, and had so distinguished himself in certain operations about Isle No. 10 on the Mississippi as to attract the attention of the authorities. His was an ardent spirit in prosperity, and he had a buoyant self-confidence that appeared to the vulgar clear evidence of ability. He was to move his troops across the Rappahannock on Richmond; it would never do to supersede McClellan at once, he was far too popular for such a step to be expedient from a party point of view; so his influence was to be undermined by withdrawing his corps from the Peninsula, and using them as supports to Pope's movement.

All this new plan was contrary to the plainest dictates of strategy, as will be obvious from a glance at the map. Clearly the right policy would have been to reinforce McClellan's army strongly at Harrison's Landing, and send it, either under his direction, or, if the Government thought fit, under some other leader, across the James; then to seize Petersburg, destroy the railways running south, and, having thus interfered with the enemy's system of supply, proceed to attack his head-quarters. Pope might also have moved southwards at the same time, and thus occupied no small

portion of the enemy's comparatively weak force; but probably his men, beyond those who were necessary to protect Washington from a raid, would have been better employed reinforcing the army in the Peninsula. Separation of force is, as a rule, inadvisable, and gives a chance to skilful opponents. Now the Confederate leaders conducted the war on strict military principles; they had the confidence of their Government, as well as of the men, and they were conversant with the theatre of operations. The theatre was new to Pope, and he was very far from conducting war on strict military principles.

General Halleck went to Harrison's Landing on July 25th and consulted with McClellan, to whose views he listened without the least intention of carrying them out. On the 30th McClellan was ordered to send away his sick by river. On August 3rd he was commanded to withdraw all his army down the Peninsula and embark for Acquia Creek. Against this he protested; but his able remonstrances were of no avail; he had to prepare for departing, and thus the Federals deliberately retired from the only line by which they had the least chance of gaining Richmond, not to recover it till two years had passed and myriads of lives had been sacrificed. Yet some writers would have us believe that they admire the United States system of government. On the other hand, the mouth of an English critic is now closed; when he begins to declaim, he remembers Gordon and the Soudan, and is silent. After a series of feints towards the Confederate works, to conceal his purpose, McClellan got his men away safely to Williamsburg and Yorktown (August 16th), and by August 20th the corps of Heintzelman, Porter, Sumner, and Franklin were ready to co-operate with the "Army of Virginia"—the name given to the short-lived organization which Pope conducted to disgrace and ruin.

Before this new army of Virginia had accomplished a march in the direction of its foes its chief had become, if not famous, at least notorious. His orders excited the amazement of all men, disgusted professional soldiers, and perplexed the simple folk who had been led to believe that the Government of the United States embodied the genius of civilization. Pope ignored international law, contemned the very fundamental canons of strategy, and revived a system of conducting war which had been discarded since Grotius by his *De Jure Belli* shamed the soldiers of the seventeenth century into humanity.

His rules preventing the irregular operations of men not in

uniform against his lines of communications, though very severe, were in accordance with strict precedent, and could be justified out of military history—for example, out of Napier. But there is no defence for these orders: "Such as are willing to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and will furnish sufficient security for its observance, shall be permitted to remain at their homes and pursue in good faith their accustomed avocations. Those who refuse shall be conducted south, beyond the extreme pickets of the army, and shall be notified that, if found again anywhere within our lines, or at any point in rear, they will be considered spies and subjected to the extreme rigour of military law. If any person having taken the oath of allegiance as above specified be found to have violated it, he shall be shot, and his property seized and applied to the public use."

Here was an outrageous stretch of military insolence and tyranny. There can be no doubt also that Pope's soldiers were permitted to pillage the people wholesale; their conduct towards their fellow-countrymen was very different indeed from the proceedings of the English in France, 1814 and 1815, or the Prussians in France, 1870.

President Davis was quite justified in issuing a remonstrance, in which he denounced the Northern army as "robbers and murderers." These transactions would have imparted a tone of deliberate ferocity and atrocity to the war, only that fortunately they were soon modified by a more civilized policy, as far, at least, as these armies were considered, and it is only fair to say that the orders for the treatment of occupied territory issued to the army of the Potomac by McClellan breathed a different spirit, and were in strict accordance with the acknowledged standards of international comity and belligerent courtesy.

Sir E. Hamley says: "When distant spectators imagine a general to be intent only on striking or parrying a blow, he probably directs a hundred glances, a hundred anxious thoughts to his communications in his rear for one that he bestows on his adversary's front." General Pope has attained unenviable celebrity in military history by setting forth orders based on exactly opposite ideas.

His singular manifesto of July 14th is too long for quotation in full; a few extracts must suffice:—"I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding them, of lines of retreat and of bases of supply. Let us discard such ideas. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before and not behind. Success and

glory are in the advance. Disaster and shame lurk in the rear." His soldiers soon found that gross neglect of the military art involved them in situations which only too strikingly confirmed the truth of the last sentence.

In the middle of July Pope's army stretched from Sperryville to Fredericksburg. Sigel was on the right, then came Banks and McDowell. One division of the latter's corps, under King, was at Fredericksburg, and, moving south, broke up the Virginia Central Railway. Hatch, who commanded the cavalry of Banks' Corps, was ordered to seize Gordonsville, but moved slowly, and was too late; as when Lee realized the nature of the new danger from the north he at once ordered Jackson to Gordonsville, which is one of those decisive points the possession of which is among the leading aims of a strategist.

"Stonewall" hurried thither July 13th with 14,000 men, and on July 27th A. P. Hill brought him about 10,000 more. Thus Lee acted boldly and promptly; a man of inferior genius would have hesitated to diminish his own command at Richmond while the army of the Potomac was still only twenty-five miles away. After a slight pause Pope moved on Gordonsville again, this time with a powerful force, in the beginning of August. It is not necessary to give details of his movements, nor to discuss how Banks got to the front from Culpeper, and how Sigel lost time in moving after him, and how there is much difference of opinion as to whether Banks was justified in fighting at all. It is enough to say that, after a variety of able movements, Jackson crossed the Rapidan, surprised Banks, who was isolated at Cedar Mountain, defeated him thoroughly August 9th, and was occupied in taking prisoners when night put an end to the conflict. Pope, who had just arrived on the scene, made Banks' men bivouac on the field of battle with the object of beginning the fight again next day. But the bright moon cast her silver mantle over the blue uniforms of the sleeping Federals, and made them a good mark for the enemy, and Jackson's guns opened a violent fire on them; completely surprised, they fell into a state of panic, and many fled to Culpeper. This success was merely tactical, and Jackson retired two days later across the Rapidan, which river the Federals continued to hold for a little longer. Pope was reinforced, first by King from Fredericksburg, and then by two divisions of Burnside's army of North Carolina, who came by way of Acquia Creek.

Lee was now convinced that the Federals were evacuating the Peninsula, and, leaving McClellan to retire unmolested, sent off

(August 13th) Longstreet to the Rapidan, and Stuart also brought his horsemen to Gordonsville, and forthwith began to threaten the Federal line of communications by every variety of cavalry tactics. Pope accordingly fell back behind the Rappahannock on the night of August 18th, and on the 21st was joined by two divisions of the army of the Potomac.

On August 22nd General Stuart made a remarkable raid, crossing the river by a ford on the right of the Federal army with about a thousand cavalry, and, guided by some friendly countryfolk, he made a rush straight for Pope's head-quarters at Catlett's station. The garrison, consisting of four companies of carabineers, was surprised and taken, and Pope, with the greater part of his staff, who were just returning from reconnoitring, had a narrow escape. Stuart took, however, all the personal baggage and official correspondence of the Federal General, and brought it back to his camp without the loss of a man.

These brilliant movements contrasted sharply with the sluggish and unromantic proceedings of the enemy. However, Lee found it impossible to force the passages of the river in face of the larger number of Federals and of their batteries, which commanded every passage; indeed, Pope would have tried an offensive return, only that he was prevented by a sudden rise of the waters.

The next move of the Confederates was a piece of strategy of the utmost daring: no less than to divide their forces, and send Jackson right round Pope's right, upon his line of communications, and when he had faced north, to bring the remainder of their troops to Jackson's support. This movement involved not only a division of force, but also a flank march in presence of an enemy superior in numbers. Now separation of force is against one of the leading directions of the military art, "concentrate when approaching the enemy," and Napoleon said that nothing is more dangerous and more opposed to the principles of the art of war than a flank march before an enemy in position. Napoleon, however, occasionally risked flank marches, and also found that, if well conducted, they might be very embarrassing. In 1800 he adventured a flank march in face of the Austrians from Ivrea to Milan. Davoust's celebrated march from Ratisbon to the Abens in 1809 was a similar movement. The Allies, under Schwartzenburg in 1813, while Napoleon was marching against Blücher north of the Riesengebirge, made a march in the direction of his line of communications, which sent him at full speed back to Dresden. Wellington, in 1813, ordered Graham from the Douro round against

the French right by Lamego, while he remained in their front till his subordinate's attack was developed. But, whether Lee acted in accordance with the art of war or not, it is clear that success justified his action. The truth is that he saw that Pope was not a really great general, he perceived that his adversary did not "appreciate the situation," and he had in Jackson a lieutenant who could be thoroughly trusted, a man fitted with the helmet of Pluto, which, as Bacon says, makes the "politic man go invisible," that is, "secrecy in council, and celerity in execution."

"Stonewall" started from Jefferson near Sulphur Springs, and crossing the Rappahannock on the extreme right of the enemy, went along the slopes of the Blue Ridge, and came into a territory which had not yet been devastated. He brought with him about 18,000 men, with ammunition waggons and cannon. He fed his army on the maize still in the fields, and on provisions supplied by the peasants; so that no *impedimenta* delayed his march. He went by Orleans, and by nightfall reached Salem. The next day he followed the railway as far as the Gap, and then, inclining to the right, he reached the little town of Gainesville, and hurried on to Bristoe, on the Orange railway, where he pillaged and destroyed trains of supplies for Pope. He had marched more than forty-five miles in two days.

The same night General Trimble, with a Carolina and a Georgian regiment, assisted by General Stuart's cavalry, seized Manassas Junction, took eight guns, with horses and equipments, and 300 prisoners, 50,000 pounds of bacon, 1,000 barrels of corned beef, 2,000 barrels of salt pork, 2,000 barrels of flour, and so forth. He distributed a large portion of these to his hungry troops, and destroyed the rest.

Next day a New Jersey brigade, under General Taylor, tried to recapture the place, but he was repulsed and killed by Hill and Taliaferro's divisions. The same day (27th) Hooker's Federal division from Warrenton Junction attacked Ewell of Jackson's force near Bristoe station, and fought a stiff action till dusk, when the Confederates retired towards Manassas.

Pope now resolved to give up all touch with Lee and turn and crush Jackson before he could be reinforced. This was wise; but he should have taken precautions to close Thoroughfare Gap against the enemy. He retreated from the Rappahannock in three columns. The first consisted of McDowell and Sigel, and moved from Warrenton on Gainesville by the main road. Pope himself was on the right, following the railway, with

Banks' Corps and part of Heintzelman's and Porter's, who had come to his assistance on the 21st. Reno and Kearney were between the two columns, and moved by country roads. This arrangement was prudent. It put Jackson in a very critical position; by the continued occupation of Gainesville he would have been cut off from all support. But Pope soon began to blunder, and his subordinates either could not or would not carry out such plans as he had, and the result was that Jackson was able to escape from a trap at Manassas Junction between the Federals at Washington and those under Pope, and take up a strong position on the old battle-field of Bull Run, where he could await the aid of Lee.

Manifestly there was no time to be lost; McDowell and other Federal officers were at or near Gainesville, so that he could not retrace his steps. Pope himself, with three corps, was on the railway; Jackson, therefore, on the night of the 27th sent Taliaferro's division by the road to Sudley Springs; Hill to Centreville, and thence across to Bull Run at Stone Bridge; and Ewell first across the river at Blackburn's Ford, and then again across back to the old battle-ground. Pope assumed that Jackson was retreating to Centreville, and accordingly ordered a concentration of all his troops at Manassas, and by removing his left from Gainesville gave up the road through the Gap to Lee.

On the 28th each side thought that the other was in full retreat. Jackson had concentrated at the Bull Run position, and fancied that the movement of McDowell and Sigel to their right was one of retreat, and accordingly fell upon their rear near Gainesville. He was very warmly received by General King, as Taliaferro, who was wounded as well as Ewell, says, "Then occurred one of the most terrific conflicts that can be conceived. For two hours and a half, without an instant's cessation, of the most deadly discharge of musketry, round shot and shell, both lines stood unmoved, neither advancing and neither broken nor yielding, until at last, about 9 o'clock at night, the enemy slowly and sullenly fell back and yielded the field to our victorious troops." This engagement was purely accidental, and produced no effects. McDowell's men went on their way to Pope, and Jackson stood as before. Had King remained on the battle-field he could have taken the Confederates in flank on their right, and thus have materially supported Pope next day.

Porter had been ordered to move from Warrenton Junction at 1 o'clock on the morn of 28th, and to be at Bristoe at daylight; but as his men were tired, the night dark, and the road blocked with

waggons, he did not start till 3 o'clock in the morning, and then could not get on quickly, so that he was not at Bristoe till 10 o'clock in the morning. The Commander-in-Chief seemed to have been perplexed by uncertainty throughout the 28th, and issued such varied orders to Porter on that day that this officer practically did nothing, and consequently was not up in time for the battle of the 29th.

By this time the Federal army had been for two days without forage for the horses, and with very little food for the men. Nevertheless, on the 29th they made a fierce assault on the enemy, which led to what is sometimes called the battle of Groveton. Jackson's force spread from Sudley Springs to near Groveton; he fronted south-east; left, A. P. Hill; centre, Ewell's division, under Lawton; right, Taliaferro's, under Starke. Their main line rested on an unfinished railway which ran in a north-easterly direction. The Federals began the attack with Sigel's and Reynold's forces, reinforced by Heintzelman and Reno; but McDowell and Porter, who might have rolled up the Confederate right, were absent from the field. Jackson's object was to hold out till Lee and Longstreet, who were now hurrying through the Gap, should arrive, and he managed to do so, though with great difficulty. As Ropes says, "The Federals fought to win the day, and attacked with great daring and perseverance. The Confederates fought that they might win to-morrow, and resisted with inflexible resolution and courage." Here is an instance of how bravely the men fought. General Glover was ordered to attack the centre of Jackson's line with his brigade, consisting of three Massachusetts regiments, and one from New Hampshire, and another from Pennsylvania. "The men were ordered to load their pieces, fix bayonets, move steadily and slowly until they felt the enemy's fire, then deliver their own fire, and then carry the position by main force, relying on the bayonet alone. These orders were literally obeyed. The railway embankment was carried after a brief but desperate resistance, in which bayonets and clubbed muskets were freely used. Beyond the embankment this gallant brigade pursued, overthrowing a second line of their opponents, until overpowered by superior numbers, when it retired, having lost nearly five hundred men in twenty minutes."

This was good "hard pounding" for starving men, and worthy of their breed. Such was the prowess of their Puritan ancestors against the chivalry of the Cavaliers, and the dash of the Irish Catholics; if their descendants be men of this stamp, the des-

tinies of America will probably be in their hands. But when night fell, "Stonewall" was still unconquered. Pope had lost about 7,000 men, he says himself, but probably not 5,000, against some 3,000 killed and wounded on the other side, and he wrote a glowing eulogy on the supposed success of his plans to the Washington authorities. But it was too late for any tactics to deliver him from the consequences of his foolish strategy. He was taught for the remainder of the campaign that lines of communications are of the first importance.

The second battle of Manassas or Bull Run was fought on the same field as the first, but the respective armies were facing in exactly opposite directions. In 1861 the Federals were attacking the Confederates who fronted to the West. In 1862 they assailed the Confederates, who were looking east, and in each case the Federal defeat was due to Confederate reinforcements attacking their outer flank. The Federals assailed Jackson most energetically on the 30th; but Lee, with Longstreet's troops, allowed them to develop their attack, and then broke their line with his artillery, which swept them off by an enfilading fire. Then the Confederates advanced and became the assailants in turn, carried Bald Hill and the now celebrated Henry House, held by United States Regulars under veteran professional soldiers. General McDowell covered the retreat across the Bull Run to Centreville very skilfully.

The losses on each side are not very clearly set forth, but Lee claims to have taken thirty guns and 7,000 prisoners. The "Army of Virginia" was now completely demoralized; there was not even a pretence of harmony between its Commander-in-Chief and leading officers; Pope was discredited in public opinion, "that sovran mistress of effects," in popular States; Halleck and some of his political friends might admire the spirit with which he bore reverses, but his career as a leader was practically over. Skulking and straggling thinned his ranks, and McClellan did not respond very eagerly to his representations as to the reprovisioning of the exhausted army. Nevertheless, he still had a large force, and he was joined by 20,000 fresh men from the army of the Potomac under able leaders—Sumner and Franklin—that is by as many men as all Jackson's divisions put together. With these, if the army had not lost heart, and the heads of the State had preserved their moral equilibrium, the farther progress of the enemy might have been at least arrested. Pope was ready to try another throw for victory. But the worst feature of all improvised military systems, and a fatal defect of democratic institutions, are

lack of provision for emergency, and of stability and silent resolution when ruin is to be averted. Boasting is followed by despair, and shallow security gives place to unreasoning panic. So it now was; and the serene intelligence of Lee saw a way to further glory through the gloom of his adversaries.

After giving his troops a little rest he crossed the Bull Run at Sudley Ford and moved by the road which leads from Aldie Gap through Fairfax Court House to Alexandria, hoping to strike the line of communications of the Federals and drive them to an utter rout. Jackson was moving well in advance of Longstreet, when at Chantilly, September 1st, he was stopped by Stevens, of Reno's Corps, who seized the colours of the New York Highlanders and led them to the attack till he was killed. Kearney, a most devoted leader, still amongst the most famous for courage of all the heroes of the war, then brought on the men till he, too, was killed. Jackson suffered heavily, but continued to press his design of outflanking the right. Longstreet came up to Jackson's aid as before, and on September 2nd Pope's army was withdrawn within the lines of Washington.

It may appear singular that such a large army as the Federals now had should have given way so easily to pressure on its flank, while Jackson had been able to hold out under apparently much less favourable conditions for two days; but Napoleon rightly said that in war "the moral is to the physical as three to one." Pope's army was completely demoralized: it had no confidence in itself; and for successful strategy credit is as essential as for the financier. It was ready to dissolve; its commander alone preserved his composure; but manifestly his career was over. As the late Mr. Greg, who took a keen personal pleasure in recounting the failures of the Yankees, says: "His routed army was chased into the entrenchments of Washington, having lost 30,000 men, with guns and colours in proportion, and quantities of small arms and stores simply incalculable." In this phrase Ropes would only alter "chased." Again their adversaries acted as commissaries to the Southern soldiers. The Virginian infantry and artillery, who had at first been armed with antiquated cannon of various calibre, converted muskets, and a few obsolete rifles, had constantly supplied themselves at the enemy's expense, and were at last provided with excellent weapons and first-rate guns, chiefly of European manufacture, captured on the field.

The works with which McClellan's foresight had surrounded Washington were now its safety. Lee contented himself with

capturing some stragglers under the heights of Washington, but did not try to take the Federal capital. Lecomte thinks he could have carried it if he had attacked at once, before the army and people could recover from the panic which set in after the utter failure of the campaign; but he preferred to cross into Maryland.

We have already seen that this State was not well disposed to the Northern cause, and it was hoped that its people might be induced to volunteer into the Southern army, that they would be willing to provide abundant supplies, and that from thence war might be safely transferred into the industrious and rich parts of Pennsylvania. Of course this movement would expose the communications with Lee's own base; but his knowledge of the character of the Northern authorities induced him to disregard this danger. He now had about 70,000 men, including the reserves. He moved by Drainsville on Leesburg; the waters of the Potomac were low, and the main body passed it by different fords near this city (5th and 6th September), while some detachments went across higher up near Williamsport. The railway was immediately seized; Point of Rocks was occupied, and the Federal troops at Harper's Ferry and on the Lower Shenandoah were isolated. Lee entered into Frederick City, September 8th, but found the Maryland folk loth to compromise themselves by declaring in his favour. He pushed his cavalry on Hagerstown, then on Chambersburg, and he ordered Jackson to invest Harper's Ferry. Moving by way of Williamsport and Martinsburg, the Federals, under White, evacuated Winchester, after destroying their magazines, and retreated to the Ferry, where a force of 12,000 men was collected together under Colonel Miles. These ought to have either withdrawn in time, as McClellan suggested, or have made a vigorous defence and held out till relieved. They did neither, were isolated, and fell an easy prey into Jackson's hands. They allowed themselves to be attacked by Jackson from the south, and McLaws from the north. The former officer most skilfully arranged a series of batteries on heights commanding the place. Miles was killed, and the garrison surrendered (September 15th). Jackson took seventy-three guns, 13,000 small arms, and immense magazines, part of which he sent up the Shenandoah Valley with a small escort, and the remainder he destroyed. This was a brilliant success; but the investing troops were obliged to hurry away at once, and, after a severe night's march, join General Lee, who by this time was in no small danger near Sharpsburg.

But we must return to the Federals. When Pope was falling

back on the capital the President and General Halleck came to McClellan's house in Washington, where his authority was limited to the command of the works and garrison, and begged him, whom they had so recently ignored, to go out and meet the army and take command of it, committing everything to his hands. He appears to have been singularly forgiving and indifferent to his own status, for he at once proceeded to act on this verbal order without requiring any official proclamation of exalted rank, or exacting any vengeance on his enemies. Pope was obliged to bow to popular indignation, but his political friends managed to procure for him the command of the campaign against the Indians of Minnesota, who had risen and perpetrated horrible atrocities. But McDowell and Porter were victimized. A general *levée* of 500,000 men for three years, or the duration of the war, had been ordered; they were to be provided by lot, or, if necessary, by conscription; but the latter measure encountered the liveliest opposition in many States. Some places paid 400 or 500 dollars a head to volunteers rather than submit to compulsory service. Sleek citizens preferred the enthusiasm of public meetings to the self-denial of camps.

McClellan soon reorganized the army, and restored confidence, and was ready to start against Lee. He arranged for the safety of the capital, leaving Banks in command with three corps; while he took with him Burnside with two corps, composing the right of the army, Sumner with two corps in the centre, and Franklin with a corps and a division on the left—in all 85,000 men. Porter joined afterwards, and brought the numbers up to nearly 100,000. Pleasanton was in command of the cavalry.

While Jackson was operating towards Harper's Ferry, and the Confederate cavalry making raids as far as Chambersburg, their main army was about Middletown, with advance-guards at Frederick and on the Monocacy. McClellan advanced slowly by bad roads north of the Potomac from Washington; but no other man in the service could have put the army in a condition to move at all in so short a time. On September 11th there were cavalry skirmishes on the Monocacy. Frederick was occupied by Burnside the next day, and on the 13th McClellan had the good fortune to get possession of Lee's orders to Hill, which the latter had dropped and a soldier picked up. From these he learned of the separation of the enemy's forces, and had he pushed on rapidly to the South Mountains, and through them, he might have interposed between Lee and Jackson and crushed them in detail. But Lee was most anxious that his colleague should have time to complete his operations against Har-

per's Ferry, and accordingly manœuvred so as to direct the weight of the hostile force on himself, and retired skirmishing over difficult country in the direction of Hagerstown. He took up a position in the South Mountain near Turner's Gap, near Boonsboro, against which McClellan's army advanced resolutely. General D. H. Hill fought well here, but could only act as a detaining force, and had to retire after a stiff fight (September 14th) against Reno's Corps, supported by Hooker, who turned the position. Reno was killed just as he was pointing out to his Staff the confusion caused in the opposite ranks by the death of an officer—this was Garland, his own class-fellow and intimate friend at West Point. Hill fell back and joined Longstreet at Crampton's Gap, which, after a murderous assault, was carried by Franklin. Had the Federal leaders been distinguished by celerity they would have reached the Antietam before it could be properly occupied for defence, and Jackson would have been unable to help his chief.

Lee occupied a good defensive position about six miles long, with his flanks resting on the Potomac, which makes a sharp bend at this part of its course, from a point a little below Mercersville to a little above the mouth of the Antietam; he thus covered the Shepherdstown Ford, by which was his line of retreat, and the town of Sharpsburg. His front was protected by the river, deeply sunk, and not easily forded, but with four bridges, of which the three northern were used by the Federals. On the right bank the ground rises rapidly, and forms a series of ridges between the river and Sharpsburg. Lee's own point of observation was about half a mile due east of the town, where the National Cemetery is now, and thence he supervised the tactics which foiled the enemy. Longstreet was on the extreme right opposite the bridge, since called Burnside's. Next to him on his left was D. H. Hill, next Hood; and Jackson's corps came up on the 16th and stood on the extreme left between Sharpsburg and Mercersville; Stuart and his cavalry were next the Potomac. A. P. Hill, on the 17th, supported Longstreet.

General James Longstreet was born in 1820, and graduated at West Point. He fought in Mexico 1846-8, and was wounded. He was a major in the Regular army when the war began. He had served in the first battle of Bull Run, and, as we have seen, in the Peninsula. He was a man of low and powerful build, with a beard reaching to his breast, and a countenance of phlegmatic imperturbability. Lee called him his "old war horse." All the Confederate officers were on their mettle at the battle of

Sharpsburg, which was deliberately fought against enormous odds.

McClellan had compelled Lee to give up his designs against Pennsylvania, and had brought him to bay within 100 miles of the capital. But now that the Federal chief was again face to face with the foe it can scarcely be denied that he was unnecessarily slow in his attacks. He might have pushed to the front much more vigorously on the 15th. On the morning of the 16th he confined himself to artillery fire and skirmishing, and thus lost an opportunity of dealing with the enemy when a large proportion of his force had not yet reached the field; but in the evening he sent Hooker across the river on the enemy's left. On the 17th he had 87,000 men to Lee's 38,000, and it must be admitted that, though his plan was sound, its execution was feeble, and his different corps did not act with that smoothness of co-operation which goes far to ensure success. The attacks were fragmentary and disjointed, instead of being simultaneous. The idea was to force the passage of the northern bridge, and, having driven in the enemy's left, threaten his line of retreat by an assault on his right from the direction of the more southern of the three bridges. In fact it was an attack by both wings, and the centre might be used to complete the victory. Lee met it by strengthening his wings, reinforcing them as necessity required, and in so doing he almost exhausted his centre, which, however, was really in no serious danger, except for a few minutes. "Fighting Joe" Hooker began the battle on the right with great bravery, leading on the 1st Federal Corps; but in vain. He was repulsed by Jackson, and was soon carried off the field wounded, and his divisions were scattered. Mansfield (12th Corps) then came on, but was killed, and his corps checked. He was followed by the three divisions of Sumner's; all in succession were repulsed, and Sedgwick's nearly annihilated. Then Franklin, on the Federal right centre, continued the engagement, and finally Burnside, with the 9th Corps, tried to storm Longstreet's position. After several costly attempts to carry the bridge the river was crossed, but the Confederates held out on their side till A. P. Hill's division, after a march of seventeen miles in seven hours, came into action, and the Federals had to retire. All their attacks had failed early in the afternoon, but they still had a considerable portion of their force intact; Porter's Corps was quite fresh, Franklin was eager for a new attack, but Sumner, an old officer, was dispirited by his own failure, and discountenanced any further efforts, and McClellan

was content to close the action by preventing Lee, who had engaged almost his last man, from following up his successful repulse of an army more than twice the strength of his own. The Confederates actually began a turning movement on the Federal right, such as they had executed so successfully on previous occasions, but the splendid Federal artillery, and the fact that their troops were now short of ammunition, rendered it impossible. The losses were enormous for the numbers engaged; on the Northern side about 12,000, and on the Southern about 8,000. Such was the exhaustion of his troops, and their lack of supplies and the prevalence of straggling, that McClellan, though reinforced by two fresh divisions, did not attack on the 18th. He determined to do so on the 19th, and sent off the cavalry with Porter in support; but Lee had retired and crossed the Potomac under the cover of his batteries at Shepherdstown.

IV.

FREDERICKSBURG.

The Confederate invasion of the North had failed. Lee's headquarters were again in his own "Empire State," between Martinsburg and Shepherdstown, and a reconnaissance by the Federals across the river on the 20th was driven back with considerable loss. McClellan, with all his faults, had again saved Washington. Lee, instead of carrying his flag as far as the Susquehanna, and perhaps entering Washington itself, was, less than three weeks after the second Bull Run, standing on the defensive in the Shenandoah Valley. He had shaken the Union to its centre, but it still stood, and was able to fight; but nothing could illustrate the inferiority of its soldiers, man for man, better than the Sharpsburg campaign, and it is amusing to read General Palfrey's explanation. He holds that this was largely due to excessive supplies! They did not fight for bread and clothes as did the Confederates! Thus a starving army is keener for victory, it seems, than a well-fed one, and the British tradition against empty stomachs is a mistake. It is obvious, of course, that generals may be so over-solicitous about the comfort of their soldiers as to neglect strategical opportunities while waiting for ample supplies, and this is the explanation of Jackson's remark, "I can whip any army that is followed by a flock of cattle." But on the other hand, Napier's remark that a soldier, like any other man, requires at least two pounds weight of food on the average daily, if he is to do efficient work, is unanswerable. It was the full hearts of the Southerners rather than their empty stomachs that made them such good soldiers. Their spirit was heroic, and their conduct admirable, in striking contrast to that of the invaders of Virginia. But their condition and appearance, when they entered Maryland, were lamentable; they were worn by marching and fighting, thousands of the men had scarcely shoes on their feet, they were in rags, and gaunt and begrimed. No wonder the prospects of a recruit in their ranks seemed far from tempting.

Both sides rested for a few weeks. McClellan, again master of Harper's Ferry, remained north of the Potomac, as the President, who was still apprehensive for the safety of Washington, was not willing that he should move into the Shenandoah Valley, and in the beginning of October his cavalry, under Pleasanton, were repulsed by Stuart, who then started on his celebrated ride into Pennsylvania.

On October 9th, with a cavalry force of 1,800 men under Hampton, W. H. Lee, and Jones, and four pieces of horse artillery under Pelham, he left Darksville and marched to Hedgeville, where he camped for the night. Next morning he crossed the Potomac at McCoy's, between Williamsport and Hancock, and went north to the turnpike leading from Hagerstown to Hancock, where a signalling party on the mountain was captured, and he learned of some movements of the enemy which he communicated at once to head-quarters. By noon he was at Mercersburg, and wished to capture Hagerstown, but found the cost might be too great, so he turned to Chambersburg, which he took in the night in the midst of severe rain. During the next day a large number of horses were seized and brought off, telegraph wires were cut, and railroads were obstructed; a great supply store was seized, and thousands of stands of small arms and much military clothing were destroyed. From Chambersburg the road to Leesburg was selected for return, as the enemy was now on the alert on the other line. After moving in a variety of directions, to throw the enemy off his scent, he proceeded into Maryland, by Emmettsburg, and went towards Frederick, near which he crossed the Monocacy, and in the night marched along the Baltimore and Ohio railway, cutting wires and destroying the line, and even crossing McClellan's waggon line, and went on to Barnesville, where he learned that Stoneman had a large number of cavalry watching the fords about Poolesville. He then threw himself into the woods near that place, and, charging some hostile cavalry and infantry who tried to obstruct him, struck out for White's Ford, and reached the south side of the Potomac safely in time to fire upon the enemy from Poolesville, who appeared on the north side after he had slipped past them. He did not lose a man killed on the raid, and but few stragglers; he brought back a number of captured horses and some hostages. The amount of damage done was enormous, and, as he says, the results of the expedition, which only lasted five days inclusive, in a moral and political point of view, can hardly be estimated, and the consternation among property-holders in

Pennsylvania beggared description. During this raid Stuart went 100 miles in forty-eight hours.

When Washington was safe the politicians soon recovered their self-possession, and commenced to interfere with the army as before. They ordered McClellan to move October 6th; but he did not receive supplies, probably because the authorities delayed them out of spite. He crossed the Potomac in the end of October, and advanced east of the Blue Ridge, leaving a corps at Harper's Ferry and three brigades farther up the river. He moved on Warrenton, seizing the passes of the Blue Ridge westward as he advanced, and depending upon Harper's Ferry and Berlin for supplies till the Manassas Gap railroad was reached. Then he could make Washington his base, and his further strategy would depend on circumstance; but he was suddenly ordered, on the night of Nov. 7th, to hand over his command to Burnside, and to leave the army. After a grand review, at which he was received with loud cheers by officers and men combined, he departed for Trenton, in Jersey, and retired for a while to private life, from which he emerged as a candidate for the Presidency.

We have already stated that his fall was due to political causes. He was sacrificed to a series of base intrigues between the wire-pullers and some of his disaffected officers. Yet he made no complaint, submitting to injustice with Roman fortitude. He may not have been very prompt and quick; in this respect he was decidely inferior to Lee or Jackson or Johnston. But he was the best general that the army of the Potomac, which he created, ever had. We saw how it fared under Pope, and the performances of Burnside, Hooker, and Meade have yet to be related; but he was incomparably superior to any of these. The impartial historian will not hesitate to compare him favourably with Grant, in spite of the eulogies of Badeau and the favours of Fortune. As Palfrey says, "With him in command the army would never have seen such days as those of the Wilderness and Cold Harbour."

At the same time as McClellan was removed Fitzjohn Porter was deprived of his corps and summoned to a council of war, at which he had no difficulty in vindicating his conduct.

General Burnside belonged to the Regular army, and was some years older than his predecessor. He had been successful in Carolina, at Roanoake, and Newbern, and had not shared in the Peninsular campaign; he was a remarkably handsome man, very brave, of fair acquirements and good sense; but, as was

soon apparent, quite unfit for the responsibility with which, without any desire on his part, as is generally believed, he was so suddenly laden. His dispositions at first were simply McClellan's; and, indeed, the latter remained a few days with the new leader to give him a better start. On November 10th the mass of the Federal troops were at the environs of Warrenton, with posts at the passes of the Blue Ridge and along the railways in the rear. One corps, the 9th, was on the line of the Rappahannock at Waterloo, and the Cavalry, under Pleasanton and Bayard, was pushed forward to within six miles of Culpeper, and their reconnoitring parties reported that the Confederates were then extended from Strasburg in the valley, where were the corps of Jackson and D. H. Hill, to Culpeper and the Rapidan, along which were Longstreet and D. H. Hill. A rapid manœuvre might have broken through this long extension, and cut off Jackson, whose position in the valley was a great encumbrance to the Federals; but changes of command are not favourable to rapidity of action. Lee quickly concentrated on his right, and a smart cavalry attack was made on Pleasanton near Culpeper.

Now would it be better for Burnside to advance on Richmond by Gordonsville, or to make Acquia Creek a new base? The latter course would obviate the necessity for guarding a long line of communications against the enterprise of Stuart; it would be a shorter route, and the advance could always keep up connection with the sea by means of the numerous creeks on its left. But these advantages were counterbalanced by tactical difficulties; a series of rivers offered good defensive lines to the enemy, and would have to be crossed by military bridges and main force in spite of a vigorous opposition. Nevertheless Burnside resolved, after consultation with Halleck, to make Acquia his new base, and, after a feint against Gordonsville, to move rapidly by the left on Fredericksburg, and cross the Rappahannock; but the Confederates had destroyed the bridge over the river, and it was necessary to provide pontoons. Burnside asked Halleck to get these; Halleck ordered the quartermaster Meiggs to do so. Meiggs handed over the execution of the duty to subordinates, who bungled so miserably that they were not ready in time. This was a fatal blunder. On the 16th the army was reorganized in four "grand divisions," each of two corps, under Sumner, Hooker, Franklin, and Sigel, who had all much liberty of action, and could communicate directly with the authorities at Washington. Banks guarded, with a detached corps, the Upper Potomac and the environs of Washington. Sigel watched Warrenton;


From Culpeper
Germania Ford
Stinkers Ford
Rappahannock River
Rapidan River
Ely's Ford
Fosters Ford
United States Ford
To Acquia Creek
Falmouth
Germania Road
Wilderness Tavern
Orange Court House Pike Road
Old Wilderness Church
Bank's Ford
Stafford Hill
Orange Plank Road
CHANCELLORSVILLE
Tabernacle Church
Marye Hill
FREDERICKSBURG
Salem Church
Lee's Hill
Hazel Run
Deep Run
Catharpen Furnace
Orange Court House Plank Road
Todd's Tavern
Brock Road
Mine Rd
Hamilton
River Road
Rappahannock R.
Catharpen Road
Massaponax River
Pamunky Road
Spotsylvania
Massaponax Church
From Richmond
Telegraph Road
RICHMOND RAILWAY
Map to illustrate
THE BATTLE OF
FREDERICKSBURG,
DEC. 1862
ENGLISH MILES
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin marched on Fredericksburg, the first leading. But the pontoons not being ready, nothing could be done, and Lee was able to reach the south bank on the 20th, and to strengthen his position in a most formidable manner.

Burnside had intended to cross the river at once, seize Fredericksburg, organize his transport, fill up with at least twelve days' provisions, and then make a rapid movement on Richmond. But as nothing was ready for an immediate passage in force, he hesitated to permit a portion of the army under Sumner to cross by fords. Every day of delay was favourable to the Confederates. They took up a position on the line of hills on the south bank of the river, from a mile and a half above the town to the Richmond Railroad below it, six miles altogether. On the left Longstreet, on the right Jackson, lower down the river D. H. Hill watched against a movement on the right flank, and the cavalry were both above and below the town.

It was impossible for Lee to prevent the passage of the river, as the south bank is completely commanded by the heights north of the town, particularly Stafford Heights, about which the Federal artillery commander, Hunt, placed numerous batteries. Lee therefore resolved to hold Fredericksburg with a small force as long as he could, to watch the river closely, but to strengthen his line with earthworks, at which his army of some 55,000 men, according to some, 75,000 according to others, laboured vigorously for some days, and to await battle under their shelter. Many houses in the town were put in a state of defence to serve as advance posts; on the right the railway covered the front, and the little river Massaponax the flank; a road for communication was laid down between the wings of the army. A long stone wall was used as a parapet. There were, at least, two lines of defence along the position, and in some places three and four. About a mile to the rear of the town were the Marye Heights, on which powerful batteries were placed, as also on Lee's Hill, and on heights to the south-east, and to close the river road on the right. In fact, the town and the plain between the town and the ridge were completely commanded by convergent fire; on the other hand, the town was equally exposed to destruction from the Federal guns on the opposite heights. When Burnside saw clearly that the proposed flanking movement and surprise had failed, he is said to have very wisely resolved to remain where he was for the remainder of the winter, and in spring to transfer himself to the James River. But this meant the complete exposure of the folly

of the Government in removing McClellan on the ground that he was slow. The General was obviously right. To carry such a position as Lee's by a front attack, against such troops as his, with even double the number of Northern soldiers, was quite impossible. Indeed, for any soldiers to carry strong positions fairly well occupied by front attack alone appears to be out of the question in modern war. The Confederates themselves failed in such enterprises, and the records of the Franco-German war—which certain critics would have us accept as final lessons—testify to the repulse of frontal attacks at Wörth, Spicheren, Borny, and St. Privat. Therefore Burnside ought not to have advanced; but again the Press and ignorant public opinion and the administration insisted on activity. He obeyed, and was ruined. He gave up strategy and tried impossible tactics.

The passage of a river in face of a numerous and resolute enemy is one of the most hazardous operations of war. Under such circumstances most commanders shrink from a direct attack, and strive by manœuvring to effect their purpose on the enemy's flank; but even then they are in much danger. They will probably find their antagonists ready for action on some strong position, and may thus have to form front to flank and fight soon after the passage, as was the case with Napoleon at Wagram and with McMahon at Magenta. After a successful passage in front the enemy will certainly be soon found in a strong position, and he must be attacked under the unfavourable condition of a river in rear in case of a repulse, into which there is a danger of being driven. It was the weakness of Lee rather than personal capacity that saved Burnside from this fate after his disastrous failure at Fredericksburg.

Covered by about 150 guns on the heights behind, the Federal engineers began to lay down pontoon bridges across the Rappahannock on the night of the 10th December, 1862, below Fredericksburg, for Franklin, who was to attack on the Confederate right, and above it for Sumner, who was directed against their left, while Hooker was in reserve. It is only fair to say that the last-named was opposed to the entire operation.

The workmen at the upper bridge were so seriously harassed by the fire from some Mississippi regiments who occupied the town that they were obliged to desist again and again. Burnside then ordered the bombardment of the town; 147 guns were turned against it, and no less than 7,350 shells fired into it. But the sharp-shooters continued to fire after the place was in flames, till driven out by a Federal brigade, which passed in boats in the evening.

The bridges were completed on the evening of the 11th, and two corps immediately began to pass, and drove in the Confederate pickets. The passage continued next day in the midst of a fog, and with little interruption from the enemy.

The best part of Burnside's plan was a turning movement against Lee's right along the old Richmond road, running from the direction of the river past the edge of the ridge occupied by the Confederates, and so southward; but this was spoiled by an order to seize Hamilton's Hill by a division—a thing impossible. Burnside's orders issued for the battle of the 13th were most uncertain, and so puzzled the generals entrusted with their execution that Franklin's career was ruined in consequence. Burnside himself took charge of the right of the line of battle, and his ablest aide-de-camp, Hardee, attached himself to the left. A desperate attack on the Confederates' right, by Meade's division of 10,000 men of Franklin's corps, in the direction of Hamilton's House, having driven aside a gun with which Pelham had enfiladed them, advanced within a few hundred yards of the position, when they were shaken by a sudden and severe fire from Jackson's artillery. However, recovering themselves, they forced in the front line under Hill; but they were met by the second line and forced step by step down the slope and across the railway, followed by the enemy into the plain. But this assault against the Confederate right was scarcely over when the left became the scene of one of the most sanguinary incidents in modern war.

Under an awful fire of artillery and small arms the Federals charged Marye's Hill in the most determined manner. French's division of Sumner's force rushed forward over broken ground in columns of brigades, and, in spite of gaps in its ranks that could be seen at the distance of a mile, reached the base of the hill where Longstreet's men, posted behind a stone wall which was parallel to their position, drove them back by an appalling musketry fire at close quarters. Nearly half the force fell on the spot, and the remainder fled under a withering artillery fire. Hancock's division took French's place; his attack lasted fifteen minutes, and he lost 2,000 out of his 5,000 men in that time. Burnside now displayed the utmost agitation, but declared that the "hill must be carried," and ordered a third charge, which he entrusted to Hooker's reserve. "Fighting Joe," in spite of his dauntless courage, protested; but in vain; and after trying to destroy the stone wall with artillery fire sent Humphrey's division against the fatal hill. To carry the Spicheren heights or the hill

at Laon would have been an easier task. The soldiers were ordered to throw off their knapsacks, not to load their rifles, but to trust to the bayonet. After sunset they charged over the dead and wounded of their own army. Of course they failed, and with a loss of 1,760 out of 4,000. This decided the battle; but on the Confederate right Jackson began to assume the offensive. He believed that as the Federal *morale* was now broken the bayonet would complete the work; but when he moved he was saluted by such a severe artillery fire that he gave up the idea, and, as it was now sunset, the engagement closed by some artillery shots from thirty guns under Stuart against the right of the Federal troops, who were falling back to the banks of the river.

Burnside formed the desperate and very foolish resolution of forming the Ninth Corps in columns of regiments, and leading it in person against Marye's Hill the next morning. He was with difficulty dissuaded from so doing by Sumner. However, he could not endure the thought of retreating, and lingered on the southern bank of the river throughout the 14th and 15th, with bands playing and flags flying. But on the night of the 15th, in the midst of a storm, the beaten army sought security under cover of its guns on the north bank.

The losses, according to the best authorities, were Federals 12,000, Confederates 1,800. There was an absolute lack of either strategical or tactical skill on the former side. Everything was done as the defenders desired, and the courage of the men was scandalously wasted in futile efforts. Meade, with 10,000 men, could not hope to defeat Jackson with double the number on the strong position near Hamilton House. Franklin, with 55,000 men, might have done so; but in spite of all the clamour afterwards raised against this general it is clear that his orders would not have allowed him to use more than a division. The assaults on Marye's Hill were a deplorable series of blunders; but the honour of the soldiers was untarnished. To quote a Confederate writer, "it is doubtful if, in any battle, men displayed greater gallantry. They rushed headlong, not only once, but thrice, into the focus of a frightful front and cross fire of artillery and small arms, losing nearly half their number in a few minutes; the ground was littered with their dead, and yet the foremost had only been able to approach within sixty yards of the terrible stone wall in advance of the hill. There they fell, throwing up their hands to indicate that they saw at last that the attempt to carry the hill was hopeless.

The battle of Fredericksburg is another proof of the truth of the axiom of war, that to attempt to pass an unfordable river at a known point in presence of a prepared army demands a great superiority of force, especially of artillery, and after the passage is accomplished this force must be carefully as well as bravely handled.

Ought Lee to have immediately followed up the repulse of the enemy by driving them into the river? They were broken, demoralized; their general had lost his head, his subordinates had lost confidence, the men were disgusted with their leaders; it is proverbial that a panic rapidly spreads among beaten troops if pressed closely, with a river in their rear. On the other hand, if he descended into the plain, the Federals, who were still very superior in numbers, might turn on him, and he would have exposed his men to the fire of the numerous guns on the other side of the river.

There is an extraordinary story that Jackson strongly recommended a night attack, and, in order to prevent the mistakes which accompany such manœuvres, suggested that they should all strip stark naked.

But on the information at his disposal Lee was probably right; his army had done enough for the present; it would not have been well to tempt fortune. Why should he risk his few men unnecessarily? As he said, "no one knows how brittle an army is." But it now appears that so demoralized had the Federal army become after the battle that a vigorous attack would probably have resulted in its utter rout.

Thus the year 1862 ended in the defeat of the fourth great effort of the northern armies to reach Richmond.

General Lee's strategy, which had been so brilliantly triumphant, has recently been discussed by such distinguished authorities that it is scarcely necessary to criticise it just now; but his mode of life in these terrible crises may well be studied. His habits were the extreme of simplicity, there were no evidences whatever at his head-quarters that he was Commander-in-Chief, or even an officer of high rank. He lived in a house-tent not differing in any particular from those used by the private soldiers of the army in winter quarters, though he might have used the best houses in the neighbourhood, which were placed at his disposal by their owners. His furniture was of the plainest. He seemed utterly indifferent to personal convenience or indulgence. All presents of luxuries he sent at once to the hospitals for the sick soldiers. He was

abstemious in all things, cared nothing for wine or any other stimulant, and never used tobacco. When not riding along his lines or among the camps to see in person that the troops were properly cared for he generally passed his time in close attention to official duties connected with the well-being of the army, or in correspondence with the authorities at Richmond. He was an especial favourite with children, in whose society he delighted. His moral character was beyond criticism, and his piety was as sincere as it was unobtrusive. Cooke says, "The men universally felt that their commander was equal to any and every emergency, and they had a profound admiration for his soldiership. Throughout the campaign Lee had not been heard to utter one harsh word; a patient forbearance and kindness had been constantly exhibited in all his dealings with officers and men; he was always in front, indifferent plainly to personal danger, and the men looked now with admiring eyes, and a feeling of ever-increasing affection, on the erect, soldierly figure in the plain uniform, with scarce any indication of rank, and the calm face, with its expression of grave dignity and composure, which remained unchanged equally on the march and in battle."

Throughout all the varying phases of this tremendous struggle for national existence Lee was esteemed alike by friend and foe, nor was he ever forgetful of the counsel which, in the *Faerie Queene*, Belphœbe gives the would-be knight:—

> Abroad in armes, at home in studious kynd,
> Who seekes with painfull toile, shall Honour soonest fynd.

The unbroken monotony of Federal failure against the brilliant southern strategist in Virginia tempts one to seek variety in the far more interesting theatre of the West, where, along the Mississippi and its tributaries, the Unionist leaders were more equally matched with their opponents, where the conditions of warfare were grand and novel and exciting beyond precedent, and where the Northern soldiery, owing to their outdoor and adventurous avocations, were better fitted for the struggle than their fellows of the eastern states. But nevertheless it is well to keep as much as possible to the one theatre till it is exhausted, as it is evident that a careful and continuous study of any particular territory will reveal the character of the warfare of which it is the scene. But if the war had been confined to Virginia by the close of 1862 the triumph of the Confederates would have been assured.

Burnside's defeat produced a profound impression in this country,

and many English and other critics foresaw the speedy destruction of the United States; indeed, wiseacres among European statesmen were already contemplating means of securing to their several countries shares in the spoil of their dissolution. Of course, in the representative assemblies the usual clamour followed upon defeat. The brave Franklin was made a scapegoat for not more decisively attacking the Confederate right, and ultimately relieved of his command, although he had been wanting neither in obedience to his superior, nor in vigour, nor in courage. But an agitation, in which many of his leading officers were not ashamed to take part, soon sprung up against Burnside himself, and his resignation was accepted by the President, January 25th. Sumner, who had been seriously stricken with illness, was also relieved of his functions, and died, aged seventy-two, before the commencement of the spring campaign. The army fell into a deplorable state of disorganization for some time. "Croaking" was heard on all sides, from divisional generals to privates.

If *morale* be of much importance the army of the Potomac was in desperate straits. Mr. Swinton says, "It would be impossible to find a graver or gloomier, a more sombre or unmusical body of men than the army a month after the battle. And, as the days went by, despondency, discontent, and all evil inspirations, with their natural consequent desertion, seemed to increase rather than to diminish."

Our readers will have already observed the leading part played by cavalry in this war, not exactly on the battle-field proper, but in reference to all strategical movements. So leading was the *rôle* of this arm that Lieutenant F. V. Greene says, "The true use of cavalry in modern warfare was developed in our civil war; in scouting and reconnaissances, in independent raids against lines of communication and supply, in following up a retreat and in doing its heavy fighting always on foot." Some military writers are fond of prophesying that "raids" will be a leading function in future European wars; but before being too dogmatic on this point they should carefully weigh the differences between European and American theatres. We must be content here, in lieu of any full discussion of this most important point, with a quotation from Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe:—"Well may the heart of many a soldier throb when he reads, how in America great masses of cavalry made marches a week long, through immense tracts of country, over mountain and valley, through rivers and wood. A *raid* means an incursion made by a large mass of cavalry, during which this

force is not only made for a time independent of the regular command of the army, but is unable to count upon any daily support from the latter, and is thus absolutely detached and left to itself, while its communications with its own troops are necessarily often temporarily cut by the enemy; being thus situated it proceeds, obeying the good pleasure of its leaders, to execute the duty which it may have been intended to carry out. . . . I cannot possibly accept the conclusion that because raids were possible and useful in America it must be advisable to employ them in Europe. In the American Civil War of Secession, as in all civil wars, the population was everywhere divided into parties. The raiding cavalry found friends everywhere, even among their enemies. The means of obtaining news, the care of the wounded, and the subsistence of the troops took quite another character when it was possible to count upon the willing assistance of at least a part of the inhabitants. Moreover, there were large forests in which the cavalry could conceal themselves and march quite unseen. On the other hand, the vast extent of uncultivated tracts of land and the virgin forests made it necessary to ride over enormous distances before reaching the enemy. The whole character of the conduct of the war was different, and that which was good in America might perhaps be only a source of failure in our country."

Woodfall & Kinder, Printers, 70 to 76, Long Acre, London, W.C.

Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 20 February, 2020